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Abstract 
Past research has documented a substitution effect between real earnings management (RM) and 
accrual-based earnings management (AM), depending on relative costs. This study contributes to this 
research by examining whether levels of (and changes in) financial leverage have an impact on this 
empirically documented trade-off. We hypothesise that in the presence of high leverage, firms that 
engage in earnings manipulation tactics will exhibit a preference for RM due to a lower possibility—
and subsequent costs—of getting caught. We show that leverage levels and increases positively and 
significantly affect upward RM, with no significant effect on income-increasing AM, while our 
findings point towards a complementarity effect between unexpected levels of RM and AM for firms 
with very high leverage levels and changes. This is interpreted as an indication that high leverage could 
attract heavy outsider scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use both forms of earnings 
management in order to achieve earnings targets. Furthermore, we document that equity investors 
exhibit a significantly stronger penalising reaction to AM vs. RM, indicating that leverage-induced RM 
is not as easily detectable by market participants as debt-induced AM, despite the fact that the former 
could imply deviation from optimal business practices.  
JEL Classifications: M40, M41 
Keywords: leverage, debt, real earnings management, accrual-based earnings management, market 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, corporate funding, ownership and control do not coincide for most listed firms. 
This results in capital owners and/or providers not having full decision-making rights when 
asymmetric information exists between inside and outside parties to the firm. In order to solve 
this agency problem, implicit and explicit contracts use accounting information relating to the 
use of resources, or generated return on investments (Beyer at al. 2010), with this information 
to be judged ex-post (with reference to the point in time in which capital was provided). 
Capital providers assess the performance of firms through the use of such information (Beyer 
at al. 2010), which enhances management motivation to artificially inflate performance in 
order to achieve a more favourable related assessment. This creates the conditions necessary 
for earnings management to take place in order to achieve managerial goals with respect to 
securing external funding. Manipulation of reported accounting information through earnings 
management severely impairs the ability of both potential creditors and investors to correctly 
assess future firm prospects and the managerial use of committed funds. 
Τhere exists a significant amount of research on earnings management (hereafter EM) based 
on accruals manipulation (accrual-based earnings management, hereafter AM) and/or real 
transactions (real earnings management, hereafter RM) undertaken in relation to financial 
leverage (or even change in leverage). A number of studies suggest that firms engage in 
income-increasing EM (AM or RM) to reduce the possibility of contractual violations (e.g., 
Defond and Jiambalvo 1994, Sweeney 1994, Jaggi and Lee 2002, or Kim et al. 2011 for RM). 
However, outside the covenant breach context, other research (e.g., DeFond and Park 1997, 
Chung et al. 2005, Lee et al. 2007, Perez-Rodriguez and van Hemmen 2010) actually 
observes a negative association between leverage and signed AM, and the same conclusion is 
deduced by Jelinek (2007) for leverage increases. This negative association between leverage 
and upward AM has been attributed to the fact that it may be efficient for creditors to incur 
the monitoring costs necessary to assess the real quality of debtors. Consequently, debt should 
be expected to actually limit opportunistic behaviour, in accordance with Jensen’s (1986) 
control hypothesis (Rodríguez-Pérez and van Hemmen 2010). 
In relation to the forms that EM can take, past research has considered that RM is harder to 
track and scrutinise for outside parties, e.g., auditors or regulators, in comparison to ΑΜ 
(Cohen et al. 2008, Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Gunny 2010, Zang 2012). This is because RM 
can be easily masked in the form of everyday business transactions, while AM involves 
accounting methods more easy to assess and monitor by outsiders (Roychowdhury 2006). 
According to the control hypothesis by Jensen (1986), one expects at the same time leverage 
to be accompanied by increased monitoring and scrutiny on the part of outside creditors. In 
this study, we expect that this stronger outsider monitoring in relation to leverage should be 
extrapolated for any outside party with an investment interest in the firm, for example, equity 
3 
 
investors. We examine whether higher levels of leverage (or increases in leverage) should be 
expected to induce a preference for RM over AM among firms with an increased motivation 
to engage in EM in order to meet or beat earnings targets (in order to avoid reporting a loss or 
a decrease in earnings compared to previous year, or to meet analyst earnings’ forecasts), 
hereafter referred to as suspect firms. This is because on one hand, creditors are interested in 
assessing and monitoring a firm’s risk profile (for estimating probabilities of default or for 
pricing new debt financing offered to the firm), while on the other, equity investors assess and 
monitor the same risk profile in their evaluation of firm investment opportunities (by 
calculating required rates of return). 
Firms with high leverage (or significant leverage increases) could be subject to a number of 
different motivations for engaging in EM in order to affect the perceptions of outside capital 
providers (debt or equity investors). These include hoping to improve the conditions at which 
they secure funding (Rodriguez-Perez and van Hemmen 2010), to improve their reserve 
bargaining power by reducing creditors’ perceived risks (Watts and Zimmerman 1986), to 
avoid debt covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo 1994, Sweeney 1994, Jaggi and Lee 
2002), to raise additional debt under favourable contracting terms, or to ‘maintain rapport 
with lenders in anticipation of repeat transactions’ (Ronen and Yaari 2005). Leverage (or 
increases in leverage) has been shown to have a negative impact on market performance (see 
Bradshaw et al. 2006, Cohen and Lys 2006, Penman et al. 2007, Dimitrov and Jain 2008, Gu 
2008, Cai and Zhang 2011). Thus, high levels of debt could also prompt the motivation to 
present an improved picture of the firm for existing and potential shareholders as well, if 
firms wish to reduce the negative impact that leverage (or increases in leverage) has been 
shown to have on market performance (Bradshaw et al. 2006, Cohen and Lys 2006, Penman 
et al. 2007, Dimitrov and Jain 2008, Gu 2008, Cai and Zhang 2011). We expect, then, that if a 
firm wishes to engage in EM for reasons related to its leverage, it should have a preference for 
the form of EM which is less open to scrutiny by outside parties, that is, RM, as opposed to 
the easier to track AM.  
Moreover, and in relation to the manifestations that EM can take, according to Zang (2012), 
AM and RM are expected to represent a joint, rather than a simultaneous, decision, depending 
on the relative costs and benefits of each type of EM, with the costs of AM increasing with 
stronger outsider monitoring (Zang 2012, Roychowdhury 2006). Zang (2012) provides 
evidence that firms suspected of earnings manipulation tactics can substitute one form of EM 
with the other, given their sequential (and not simultaneous) nature: in her sample of suspect 
firms she reports evidence that AM is undertaken posterior to unexpected RM, as RM can be 
undertaken during the entire fiscal year, while AM can be used for fine-tuning current period 
earnings after the fiscal year has ended but before reporting financial results, depending on 
‘how much work’ has been done using RM in order to achieve earnings targets (Zang 2012). 
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In this study, which investigates the effect of leverage on this empirically documented 
substitution (trade-off), we therefore base our analysis on the theoretical and empirical 
conclusions deduced by Zang (2012) to the effect that the decision to engage in AM and RM 
is a joint rather than a simultaneous one, with the decision determining the levels of AM 
lagging behind the decision to engage in RM.  This would be applicable to all firms suspected 
of engaging in EM in order to achieve earnings targets.  
At the same time, we consider that any motivation for EM with reference to levels of leverage 
can also apply to changes (increases) in leverage. This is because under asymmetric 
information between managers and outside parties, we expect, as would be the case for higher 
vs lower leverage levels, that leverage increases should result in the communication to outside 
capital providers of a higher risk profile for the firm. This could concern both default as well 
as investment risk, depending on the type of capital provider each time.  
If one believes, as we assume in this paper, that outsiders will increase their monitoring 
efforts when firm financial leverage is or gets higher, then one should expect that leverage 
levels/changes would influence the trade-off between RM and AM documented by previous 
research (Zang 2012). Our expectation is that the well-documented (sequential) substitution of 
unexpected levels of RM (undertaken during the fiscal year) with AM (used after the fiscal 
year end but before the reporting of financial results) might turn into complementarity for 
highly-levered suspect firms; as outsider scrutiny increases with leverage, highly-levered 
suspect firms may not be able to attain earnings targets by relying only on one type of EM. 
Using all non-financial firms from Compustat during 1990-2009, and calculating values of 
proxies for RM (abnormally low levels of discretionary expenses or evidence of 
overproduction) and AM (discretionary accruals), we first show, through standard portfolio 
analysis, that higher levels of leverage positively and significantly associate with higher levels 
of upward RM. At the same time, higher (rather than lower) levels of leverage are not 
observed to consistently and significantly associate with higher signed discretionary accruals. 
This empirical conclusion is deduced for firms with an assumed motivation to engage in EM 
in order to avoid reporting a loss or a decrease in earnings compared to previous year levels, 
or avoid missing an earnings target set by financial analysts. Furthermore, we implement a 
Hausman test (Hausman 1978) which confirms that AM is undertaken sequentially to RM. 
We continue our analysis by employing an empirical setting similar to that of Zang (2012) 
and Chan et al. (2015) for EM suspect firms, which considers that the decision to engage in 
AM and RM is a joint one, with AM undertaken depending on levels of unexpected RM 
incurred during the year, depending on relative costs and benefits of both AM and RM. In this 
setting, we confirm that financial leverage has a significantly positive effect on RM, but no 
significant influence on AM, with the former effect stronger for higher levels of leverage. At 
the same time, our findings indicate the existence of a complementarity effect between 
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unexpected levels of RM and AM. This becomes very strong for highly indebted firms. In 
other words, in the presence of high levels of leverage, the trade-off effect between RM and 
AM is observed to turn into a complementarity effect. This is interpreted as an indication that 
very high leverage attracts heavy outsider scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use RM 
in combination with AM to be able to achieve earnings targets. Finally, our findings generally 
remain qualitatively similar (although significantly weaker) when we repeat our analysis for 
changes in leverage, in addition to levels of leverage.  
Furthermore, we examine the impact of leverage-induced RM and AM on the reactions of 
investors regarding suspect firms, this impact being assumed to become evident in the course 
of  market appraisal in the case of equity investors. We deem this investigation important 
because past research has hypothesised that RM is more harmful than AM for future firm 
performance, as the former form of EM represents a departure from possibly optimal business 
decisions for the mere purpose of influencing reported income (Graham et al. 2005, Cohen et 
al. 2008). Thus, we aim at assessing whether investors identify and manage to see through 
such EM practices, i.e., whether investors incorporate such EM actions into the expectations 
on which they base their equity holding decisions. Stock market participants are expected to 
react negatively if they manage to see though EM, as they understand that it creates a biased 
picture of the firm’s future cash flow and earnings generation potential. If RM undertaken in 
relation to levels or changes in leverage by suspect firms is detected with more difficulty than 
AM, we expect a stronger (negative) association between AM and changes in leverage and 
market performance compared to RM, at least in the short run. The focus of our investigation 
on the consequences of leverage-induced EM is on the investor group whose reaction should 
be the quickest to respond, that is equity investors. Their reaction and stock market valuations 
could of course in turn affect debt investor perceptions of relevant firms. 
Our findings confirm the above hypotheses when we directly test for the possible impact of 
leverage-induced AM and RM on the subsequent stock market performance of firms for the 3 
to 24 months following portfolio formation. By examining the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
of double-sorted portfolios, formed based on the amount of firm AM or RM metrics observed 
in a given year, and the level of firm leverage (and leverage change) in that year, we 
demonstrate that on average, for a given level of leverage, there exists a significantly negative 
association between AM and subsequent stock returns in the 3 to 6 months after portfolio 
formation. This phenomenon is observed to dissipate within one year. In contrast, firms that 
employ income-increasing RM tactics, when compared to ‘same-leverage’ firms that refrain 
from RM, are found to have indistinguishable stock market performance over the following 
two years, with all results remaining qualitatively similar when the analysis is repeated for 
changes in leverage, instead of levels of debt. These findings lead to the conclusion that 
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equity investors seem to penalise more heavily and readily accrual-based debt-induced EM, 
which is interpreted as an indication that AM can be more easily detected than RM.   
Overall, our findings are consistent with leverage inducing a preference for RM rather than 
AM. We have identified up to this point two main groups of capital providers whose 
perceptions on the risk profile of firms could be significantly affected by EM: creditors and 
equity investors, both existing and potential. The main difference between the two groups 
relates to the fact that, in contrast to shareholders, even if investment risks increase, debt-
holders are not residual claimants; they are by definition more concerned with receiving 
repayment of their capital and interest, rather than with maximising the value of the firm. 
Thus, if a highly levered firm engages in RM by deviating from optimal business practices, as 
long as it has enough cash to repay obligations, such a decision could be possibly indifferent 
or even optimal for its creditors (in the case, for example, where RM takes the form of a 
reduction in discretionary expenses), but not necessarily for its shareholders. For the latter, 
optimal actions would be those maximising the value of the firm from a business perspective, 
which would not be supported by, for example, cutting down on operating costs useful for 
sustaining or promoting a firm’s competitive advantages. At the same time, agency theory 
considers the value of distressed firms’ equity to work in the form of a call option, from 
which shareholders cannot benefit if a firm’s assets decrease in value. Such a decrease may 
result from possible retraction in its economic activity or loss of competitive advantages due 
to RM. That is to say, an alternative interpretation for our findings could be that the positive 
relationship between debt and RM may instead reflect debt-holders’ preference, and thus not 
constitute a pure EM practice in their eyes, but rather a strategy to transfer value and 
redistribute risks from debt-holders to equity holders. In this respect, RM in the form of 
overproduction could also work in the same direction as reduction in discretionary expenses, 
if one considers that overproduction may require additional debt, which may increase debt 
holders’ value (as a firm’s debt suppliers) if risk is ultimately borne by shareholders. 
Furthermore, in the case where debt is supplied by banks, agency problems in banks 
themselves (involving their executives and owners) would also support a preference for RM, 
taking into account that debt supply decisions do involve significant agency costs in firms 
(also from the point of view of relevant fund providers or banks if they play that role).
1
   
The contribution of our study is threefold. First, we show that leverage and changes in 
leverage are factors with a consistent and significant positive impact on upward RM as 
opposed to AM. We provide evidence that firms with earnings targets in place tend to prefer 
RM over AM for higher levels of leverage or increases in the latter. This evidence builds on 
the literature on motivations for EM depending on the level of outside scrutiny by providing 
                                                          
1
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this argument regarding agency costs in 
debt providers (e.g., banks). 
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evidence that an environment of increased monitoring and scrutiny indeed promotes a 
preference for RM over AM. Second, our study builds on previous research that explores 
possible factors that simultaneously determine RM and AM by showing that the substitution 
effect between unexpected levels of RM and AM shown by past research (Zang 2012) may 
turn into a complementarity effect at very high levels of leverage. In other words, while 
generally a substitution effect between AM and RM is to be expected, very high levels of 
leverage (or relevant increases) may mean that firms cannot achieve earnings targets by 
relying only on one method of EM, so they have to complement one form with the other. This 
evidence on complementarity between AM and RM, when one single form of EM appears to 
be insufficient, is consistent with evidence observed by past research in other settings, for 
example around SEOs by Cohen and Zarowin (2010).  
Finally, it has been established in the literature that high amounts of debt may harm firms by 
causing underinvestment problems (Myers 1977), i.e., an unwillingness to undertake positive 
net present value projects given that debt will have to be serviced first. High existing debt can 
thus constitute a motive for deviation from optimal business decisions. Our findings show that 
leverage-induced AM is significantly more heavily penalised by stock market participants 
than relevant RM undertaken in relation to leverage, at least for the first months after 
engaging in such practices. To this effect, our evidence indicates that, for a given level of 
leverage, capital providers might not react accordingly to income-increasing RM, but do 
penalise for AM. In this context, despite the fact that the resulting promotion of RM over AM 
may have more severe economic consequences, in the form of deviation from optimal 
business practices, nevertheless stock market participants are observed to under-react, in the 
short-run at least, to this form of EM which is in theory more difficult to detect (RM). This 
should be of particular interest and concern to investors, as well as to parties engaging in 
lending to, or any kind of business transactions with, the firm, to the extent that a firm’s 
market performance is considered to be indicative of its true economic performance. 
Recent studies (Walker 2013) have called for awareness of empirical research on earnings 
management with respect to how this research relates to the revelation principle (Dye 1988, 
Arya et al. 1998). The revelation principle predicts that managers will not be able to benefit 
from EM unless a number of perfect market conditions hold (Alhadab et al. 2015, Walker 
2013). This then requires the provision of an adequate frame for theoretical predictions and 
empirical findings with respect to which conditions make EM possible each time. Information 
differentials between managers and outside parties have been considered to represent a setting 
which may lead to benefits to managers if they engage in EM (Alhadab et al. 2015). In this 
case, the existence of high levels of financial leverage (or increases in such) is expected to 
inherently result in differential levels of information between information-sharing insiders and 
different groups of outsiders; higher debt may very well result in value transfer and risk 
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redistribution from debt-holders to equity holders, while EM may result in different 
perceptions of such groups of outsiders with regard to firm risk, when managers can influence 
such perceptions via EM tactics. At the same time, the findings of this study on a 
complementarity effect between AM and RM in the presence of high leverage constitute 
evidence of multiple forms of EM coexisting for the population of suspect firms, confirming 
relevant theoretical predictions made by past research (Walker 2013).  
The rest of the study is organised as follows: In Section 2, we review the relevant literature 
that motivates the research hypotheses tested in this study. Sections 3, 4 and 5 describe the 
earnings management metrics, present the basic methodology employed by the study, and 
further present the sample selection process and report descriptive statistics for our sample, 
respectively. Section 6 reports and discusses our empirical findings, while the concluding 
Section 7 summarises the research findings of the study. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
With reference to securing external funding, the role of accounting information is expected to 
be twofold: First, it allows capital providers, i.e., both equity investors and creditors, to 
evaluate firm investment opportunities (the ex-ante or valuation role of accounting 
information) and it further allows these providers to monitor the use of their committed 
capital (the ex-post or stewardship role of accounting information, see Beyer et al. 2010). In 
the case of existing and potential creditors, accounting information is expected to help them to 
continuously assess firms’ credit risk (and changes in such), while in the case of existing and 
potential equity investors, accounting information should help them assess firms’ risk 
profiles, which have direct repercussions for their expected returns. According to Jensen’s 
(1986) control hypothesis, leverage has been considered to attract increased monitoring and 
scrutiny on the part of outside creditors, with this monitoring expected to extrapolate for any 
outside party with an investment interest in the firm, such as equity investors. This is because 
higher (as opposed to lower) levels of leverage (or increases in leverage) should result in 
increased credit risk for the firm and an increased likelihood of non-serviced future debt 
obligations. This higher risk could be making it cost-efficient for creditors to incur the 
monitoring costs necessary to assess the real quality of debtors, resulting in increased outside 
monitoring on the part of creditors (Rodríguez-Pérez and van Hemmen 2010). At the same 
time, however, it could also be worth the cost for equity investors to monitor the going 
concern of the firm as residual claimants. In this way, in line with arguments suggested by 
Jensen (1986), we expect that higher levels of debt (or changes in debt) should be 
accompanied by increased monitoring from external parties providing funding to the firm.  
There also exists a significant amount of research on accrual-based and/or real EM (upward or 
downward) undertaken in relation to the levels of leverage held by firms. Extensive evidence 
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suggests that firms engage in income-increasing EM to reduce the possibility of contractual 
violations (Defond and Jiambalvo 1994, Sweeney 1994, Jaggi and Lee 2002, Beatty and 
Weber 2003), which is followed, though, by downward earnings management during debt 
renegotiations (Mohd Saleh and Admed 2005). This type of behaviour has been considered 
the result of what is known as the ‘debt hypothesis’ (Fields et al. 2001), stemming from 
positive accounting theory, which predicts that managers will choose to avoid covenant 
violations, as such violations are costly (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 1990). Still, outside the 
covenant breach context, other research (e.g., DeFond and Park 1997, Becker et al. 1998, 
Chung et al. 2005, Lee et al. 2007, Zhong et al. 2007, Perez-Rodriguez and van Hemmen 
2010) actually observes a negative association between leverage and signed AM. This 
negative association between leverage and upward AM has been attributed to the fact that it 
may be efficient for creditors to incur the monitoring costs necessary to assess the real quality 
of debtors, so debt should be expected to actually limit opportunistic behaviour (Jensen’s 
(1986) control hypothesis; Rodríguez-Pérez and van Hemmen 2010).  
Research on RM undertaken in relation to leverage, however, is more limited: Roychowdhury 
(2006), for example, demonstrates a positive association between the existence of debt in a 
firm’s balance sheet and upward RM. Bartov (1993) finds that firms sell fixed assets to avoid 
covenant violations and Trueman and Titman (1988) observe that managers use RM to 
smooth reported income to decrease the cost of debt. More recently, Kim et al. (2011) show 
that firms use upward RM to avoid covenant violations. 
In relation to the manifestations that EM can take, research initially provided evidence on AM 
or RM on a context-specific basis (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008, before and after the enactment of 
SOX, or Cohen and Zarowin 2010, on RM for firms engaging in SEOs). Then Zang (2012) 
extensively examined the use of both AM and RM tactics using a fairly general setting for all 
firms likely to have engaged in EM in order to meet or beat earnings targets, the so-called 
suspect firms. According to Zang (2012), AM and RM are expected to represent a joint rather 
than a simultaneous decision, depending on relative costs and benefits of each type of EM, 
with the costs of AM increasing with stronger outsider monitoring (Zang 2012, 
Roychowdhury 2006). Managers’ ability to engage in upward AM in the current period, 
meanwhile, may also be constrained by accrual management activities in previous periods 
(Zang 2012). RM is by definition undertaken during the fiscal year, while AM can be used for 
fine-tuning current period earnings after the fiscal year has ended but before reporting 
financial results. Higher (lower) RM during the year is then expected to be accompanied by 
lower (higher) AM, depending on ‘how much work’ has been done using RM in order to 
achieve earnings targets (Zang 2012).  Zang (2012) confirms the sequential nature of the two 
forms of EM (i.e., that AM is undertaken posterior to unexpected RM) by performing a 
relevant Hausman test (Hausman 1978), and provides evidence on a direct substitution 
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between AM and unexpected levels of RM depending on relative costs and benefits. 
Similarly, a recent study by Chan et al. (2015) examining the use of both forms of earnings 
management fully adopts the theoretical and empirical conclusions of Zang (2012) in its 
design, i.e., the sequential nature of AM with respect to RM and substitution between AM and 
unexpected levels of RM undertaken during the year.  
In relation to this point, past research has considered and observed that RM is harder to track 
and scrutinise for outside parties, e.g., auditors or regulators, in comparison to ΑΜ (Cohen et 
al. 2008, Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Gunny 2010, Zang 2012). For example, Cohen et al. 
(2008) offer evidence on firms replacing AM with RM due to greater monitoring after the 
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley (hereafter SOX), while Zang (2012), as discussed, finds that 
firms substitute AM with RM and vice versa depending on relative costs, which are expected 
to be higher for AM in the case of increased outsider scrutiny. This is because RM can be 
masked in the form of everyday transactions and may thus be indistinguishable from normal 
or ‘business as usual’ operations, despite the fact that relevant actions could have been 
undertaken merely for the purpose of influencing earnings (Roychowdhury 2006). In contrast, 
AM only involves modifications in accounting methods and has an impact on accruals, and is 
thus expected to be relatively easier for outsiders to identify. Consequently, despite the fact 
that RM involves business decisions and direct cash flow consequences while AM does not 
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010), it may be preferred to AM because the latter bears a higher risk of 
direct repercussions involving greater private costs for managers if caught (Roychowdhury 
2006).  
These outsiders may take the form of regulators (e.g., the SEC, resulting in class action 
litigation, see Gunny 2010) or auditors (see Roychowdhury 2006 and Zang 2012), but may 
also include creditors, interested in assessing and monitoring a firm’s risk profile, and equity 
investors, interested in predicting and evaluating firm investment opportunities. Firms with 
high levels of debt (or large increases in debt) could have a number of different motivations 
for engaging in EM, in order to affect the perceptions of outside capital providers (debt or 
equity investors). In this respect, highly levered firms have been expected to engage in 
upward EM to improve the conditions under which they secure funding (Rodriguez-Perez and 
van Hemmen 2010), improve their reserve bargaining power by reducing creditors’ perceived 
risks (Watts and Zimmerman 1986), or avoid debt covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo 
1994, Sweeney 1994, Jaggi and Lee 2002).  
However, leverage can be connected with motivation for upward EM, even in the absence of 
possible covenant violations. Presenting a rosy picture of the firm’s ‘financial slack’ through 
EM can affect any kind of contractual outcome in relation to servicing current debt or being 
able to raise additional debt in the future and negotiate relevant contracting terms, or it can 
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serve to ‘maintain rapport with lenders in anticipation of repeat transactions’ (Ronen and 
Yaari 2005, p. 163).
2
   
Furthermore, the level of debt could also prompt the motivation to present to equity investors 
(existing or potential) an improved picture of the firm, in the case that firms wish to reduce 
the negative impact which leverage has been shown to have on stock market performance 
(Bradshaw et al. 2006, Cohen and Lys 2006, Penman et al. 2007, Dimitrov and Jain 2008, Gu 
2008, Cai and Zhang 2011). This negative effect of high leverage on subsequent stock market 
performance has been found to be robust to a number of controls for risk or mis-pricing 
(Penman et al. 2007) and to contradict theoretical predictions about a positive association 
between risk and return (Piotroski 2007, Gu 2008). This result, in the case of leverage 
changes, has been considered by Cai and Zhang (2011) to be consistent with the market 
penalising for possible underinvestment problems, as underinvestment may reduce future 
growth opportunities for the firm, in line with the relevant hypothesis by Myers (1977).  Were 
a high-debt firm aware of this negative pricing of leverage by the market, it may want to 
engage in window-dressing tactics to mitigate this effect of leverage. An unfavourable market 
pricing is undesirable by firms and their management in many respects, ranging from 
managers’ career concerns and bonuses and their external reputation together with that of the 
firm – with a corresponding effect on the ability to secure capital and attract investors in the 
future – to political visibility (Graham et al. 2005). 
In this way, based on the assumption that higher levels of leverage (or changes in leverage) 
are likely to be accompanied by heavier scrutiny by outside parties (auditors, regulators, and 
also debt and equity investors), combined with the assumption that RM is less easily 
detectable than AM in accordance with extensive respective arguments and/or evidence 
provided by past research, we expect that if a firm wishes to engage in EM, it should have a 
preference for RM in relation to AM, leading to our first research hypothesis:  
H1: Other things being equal, higher levels of leverage (or increases in leverage) are 
expected to induce a preference for RM over AM among suspect firms engaging in EM.  
To test the above hypothesis, and for all subsequent arguments and hypotheses, we base our 
analysis on the theoretical and empirical conclusions deduced by Zang (2012) that the 
decision to engage in AM and RM is a joint rather than a simultaneous one, with the decision 
determining the levels of AM lagging the decision to engage in RM. Furthermore, no 
definitive conclusions can be reached on EM undertaken by firms without simultaneously 
                                                          
2
 At this point, it should be mentioned that past research has also associated high leverage and 
specifically debt covenant violation with downward earnings management, in an effort on the part of 
firms to achieve better concessions during debt renegotiations (Rodriguez-Perez and van Hemmen 
2010, Becker et al. 1998, Mohd and Ahmed 2005). Reference is made to this research in order to 
provide a complete account of different motivations for EM. However, EM in the course of debt 
renegotiations is considered to represent a more specialised event context. 
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addressing both forms of EM (Zang 2012). The sample employed for all empirical analyses 
focuses on suspect firms or firms marginally meeting or beating earnings targets, in 
accordance with past research (see Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al. 2008, Zang 2012, Chan 
et al. 2015), and EM decisions undertaken by these firms in relation to their levels or changes 
in financial leverage.  
All previous discussion on motivations for EM has mainly been made with reference to levels 
of leverage, but is expected to also apply to changes (increases) in leverage. As Gu (2008) 
points out, a leverage increase is expected either when the firm has generated cash flows 
lower than anticipated, or when there are profitable growth opportunities in place which 
require funding. The first motivation is obviously not desirable by lenders, while the second 
one should be welcomed, as long as the debt raised is invested into positive net present value 
projects (Gu 2008). Under asymmetric information between managers and outside parties, in 
either case, we expect that, in line with results for higher vs lower leverage levels, leverage 
increases result in increased risk for outside providers of capital. In the case of creditors, 
increases in leverage signify potential increases in credit risk, ceteris paribus, while increases 
in leverage also manifest a higher risk profile for equity investors.  Regarding the perception 
of changes in leverage by outsiders, Jelinek (2007) argues that increases in leverage should 
reduce opportunistic behaviour, as managers cannot afford to waste money in the presence of 
predefined payments that need to be made, so leverage increases should reduce EM. She 
provides evidence that leverage increases lead to a decrease in accrual-based EM, a finding 
attributed to a reduction in managers’ opportunistic behaviour and an increase in discipline. 
However, in our case, we take a more comprehensive approach with respect to EM in relation 
to leverage and examine the joint decision to engage in either RM or AM, on which we 
hypothesise in favour of a tendency of higher levels of leverage to induce RM vs AM as a 
preferred choice for firms engaging in EM.   
As discussed, past research has provided either context-specific evidence (Cohen et al. 2008 
on AM getting substituted by RM after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act) or more 
general but direct evidence (Zang 2012, for all firms marginally meeting or beating earnings’ 
targets) on a substitution between RM and AM, depending on relative costs and benefits 
(Zang 2012). At the same time, though, other research has observed the simultaneous use of 
AM and RM (Cohen and Zarowin 2010); in certain situations, it may not be sufficient for a 
firm to achieve desired earnings targets by engaging solely in AM (Roychowdhury 2006), so 
both forms of EM may have to be used in order to achieve such targets. In this respect, in the 
context of assumed increased monitoring by outsiders in the presence of higher levels of 
leverage (or changes in leverage), we expect that the level of leverage should influence the 
trade-off between RM and AM observed by past research in an effort to achieve earnings 
targets. More specifically, we expect a complementary function of AM undertaken after the 
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end of the fiscal year but before the reporting of financial results, with unexpected levels of 
RM undertaken during the fiscal year. This is because the former type of EM can be used to 
supplement the result achieved with RM during the financial year, where increased outsider 
scrutiny in the presence of higher levels of leverage (or changes in such) may not permit firms 
to achieve earnings targets by relying only on one type of EM. In this case, other things being 
equal, higher levels of leverage (or increases in leverage) should affect the trade-off or 
substitution effect between RM and AM established by past research (Zang 2012) for suspect 
firms, and the relative use of AM combined with RM in order to achieve earnings targets, 
leading to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Highly indebted firms suspect of managing their earnings are expected to complement 
RM efforts during the fiscal year with AM choices after the year end (but before the reporting 
of financial results).  
Regarding the possible consequences of AM and RM, past research has generally 
hypothesised and found that RM is more harmful than AM for the future performance of 
firms, as the former type of EM represents a departure from possibly optimal business 
decisions with the mere purpose of influencing reported income (Graham et al. 2005). Gunny 
(2010) reports that firms engaging in RM to meet earnings benchmarks actually outperformed 
firms which had not been involved in RM (and missed such benchmarks). However, Graham 
et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2008) argue that RM is a more costly strategy than AM. In a 
similar vein, Bhorjaj et al. (2009) shows that RM to meet earnings benchmarks is harmful for 
stock market performance in the long run, but has some temporary benefits, while 
Badertscher (2011) provides evidence on the use of RM to sustain overvalued equity.  Given 
that EM in any form is by definition expected to influence accounting-based operating 
performance measures, it is natural to anticipate that any impact that leverage (or leverage 
changes) might have on AM and RM should affect the active stance that capital providers 
(creditors and equity investors) take towards the firm. An investigation of subsequent capital 
provider reaction that simultaneously accounts for leverage levels and increases and possible 
leverage-induced AM and RM would allow a direct assessment of whether capital providers 
identify and manage to see through such EM practices, and if so, whether they price such 
actions through their willingness to lend to the firm (for debt investors) and the determination 
of stock returns (for equity investors).  
At this point, it is assumed that to the extent that RM takes the form of deviation from 
possibly optimal operating decisions, with simultaneous direct cash flow consequences, it 
should be more harmful for the future economic value of the firm than AM, and in line with 
this, past research has considered RM more costly than AM for shareholders (Cohen et al. 
2008). We propose that this consideration is in accordance with previously used arguments 
that equity investors are residual claimants, and therefore more strongly interested in and 
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sensitive to the best possible competitive positioning of the firm from a business perspective 
compared to debt holders, whose main concern should be capital and interest payback rather 
than firm value maximisation. This argument by no means rejects the fact that equity and debt 
investors are also harmed by the practice - without cash-flow consequences - of AM, to the 
extent that AM prevents them from having a correct economic picture of the firm which 
would permit unbiased investment and credit decisions. However, a distinction between AM 
and RM is made based on the fact that the latter form of EM incurs cash flow consequences 
and operating decisions which can make a firm deviate from optimal business positioning. 
Debt investors are not residual claimants and are mainly interested in securing debt payback. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that they are misled by RM and would have possibly taken 
different debt-related decisions had RM been absent, they are expected to be harmed by RM 
as well as equity investors, although to a lesser extent due to weaker interest in firm value 
maximisation compared to equity investors. Thus, both debt and equity capital providers can 
be expected to react in a negative and penalising way if they see through EM, as they 
understand that it creates a biased picture of the firm’s credit risk profile and future cash flow 
and earnings generation potential. In the case of debt investors, relevant reaction could, for 
example, take the form of refusing to provide additional funds to the firm, or of providing 
debt under worse terms, while equity investors could react more immediately if they detect 
EM of any form by becoming bearish with respect to the firm’s stock. Consequently, if RM 
undertaken in relation to levels or changes in leverage is detected with more difficulty than 
AM, we expect a stronger (negative) association between AM and changes in leverage and 
market performance, compared to RM. This should hold at least in the short run, as the firm’s 
management tells the market ‘what they want to hear’, according to Bhojraj et al. (2009), until 
investors have the time to fully evaluate the possible operating implications of RM. Based on 
arguments employed by previous research, EM of any form should have a negative effect on 
suspect firm market valuation, on the assumption that it distorts the presentation of the true 
financial position of the firm at the risk of getting caught and penalised accordingly. We 
expect that high leverage should play a role in this valuation, and to the extent that EM results 
in creating a masked picture of suspect firm value to equity investors, the EM form expected 
to be more difficult to detect, i.e., RM as opposed to AM, should have a less negative impact 
on the perceptions of market participants. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: RM rather than AM, undertaken in relation to leverage levels, should have a less 
negative effect on market valuation because of greater difficulties of detection. The same less 
negative effect should apply to increases in leverage. 
It should be mentioned at this point that the focus on equity rather than debt investor reaction 
is mainly based on the observation that the former group has the possibility of reacting more 
quickly to any detected RM and AM, through the formation of stock returns. Debt investors, 
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however, may react in ways not so readily perceived or understood, or may even react over 
longer term horizons, by reducing, for example, the amount of debt offered to the firm, or by 
tightening credit terms, or through deterioration in credit ratings. Thus, we focus on the 
interest group whose reaction is the most quick to be captured, that is equity investors. Their 
reaction and stock market valuations could in turn affect debt holders’ perceptions of relevant 
firms. At the same time, we do not assess the consequences of leverage-induced AM and RM 
in terms of future operating performance measured through the use of accounting figures, as 
we expect a significant amount of endogeneity to exist in such a process, i.e., assessing the 
result of a process (EM) which by definition aims at improving reported performance. The 
formation of stock returns, however, is by construction more immune to influences from 
reported accounting figures (earnings, but also cash flows, as RM does have cash flow 
consequences), as it is heavily based on the formation of expectations.   
3. Estimation of Earnings Management Metrics 
3.1 Detecting Accrual-based Earnings Management (AM) 
Following previous literature on the joint examination of AM and RM (Roychowdhury 2006, 
Cohen et al. 2008, Cohen and Zarowin 2010), we test for the existence of AM by estimating 
discretionary accruals (hereafter DA), i.e., accruals arising from accounting treatments chosen 
in order to manage earnings. We differentiate these from non-discretionary accruals, or 
accruals arising from transactions characterised as normal when taking into account a firm’s 
performance, strategy, industry conventions, macro-economic events or other factors (Ronen 
and Yaari 2005). Previous research simultaneously testing for the existence of AM and RM 
has mainly made use of unsigned discretionary accruals - rather than signed ones - or has 
explicitly differentiated between positive and negative ones. However, our hypotheses on the 
existence of AM and RM depending on the level of leverage are directional in nature. Larcker 
and Richardson (2004) and Rodríguez-Pérez and van Hemmen (2010) argue than when EM is 
directional, then the appropriate measure to use for AM is signed or raw accruals, so we make 
use of signed discretionary accruals, estimated according to the following three methods: 
AM Model 1: Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 1995) 
We first estimate cross-sectionally the following regression for all years according to 2-digit 
SIC codes:  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
where (Compustat item # in parentheses): 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  firm 𝑖’s Total Accruals calculated from the Cash Flow Statement  
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  (TACFS) in year 𝑡, defined as (𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡); 
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  firm  𝑖’s Νet Income Before Extraordinary items (#123) in year 𝑡; 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 =  firm 𝑖’s Cash Flows from Operations (#308) in year 𝑡; 
𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =  firm 𝑖’s change in Revenues (#12) between year 𝑡 − 1 and year 𝑡; 
𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  firm 𝑖’s change in Accounts Receivable (#2) between year 𝑡 − 1 and   
  year 𝑡. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  firm 𝑖’s gross value of Property, Plant and Equipment (#7) in year 𝑡; 
𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  error term.  
All regression variables in the above equation (including the constant term) are scaled by 
Total Assets (#6) at the end of year 𝑡 − 1.3 
We then use the industry and year-specific parameter estimates ?̂?0, ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 to infer 
discretionary accruals via: 
𝐷𝐴𝑀𝐽𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?0 − ?̂?1(𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − ?̂?2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
We will denote discretionary accruals estimated from the Modified Jones model with 
𝐷𝐴𝑀𝐽𝑖,𝑡. In estimating this model, we subtract the change in accounts receivable from change 
in revenues before model estimation, following Kothari et al. (2005), DeFond and Park (1997) 
or Cohen et al. (2008). 
For robustness purposes, we make use of two alternative estimation methods for DA, results 
on which are reported in some instances and mentioned among robustness checks in others. 
AM Model 2: Jones Model (Jones 1991)  
We first estimate cross-sectionally the following regression for all years according to 2-digit 
SIC codes: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where all variables as before. Then we use the industry and year-specific parameter estimates 
?̂?0, ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 to infer firm-specific discretionary accruals from the Jones model (𝐷𝐴𝐽𝑖,𝑡) 
through 
𝐷𝐴𝐽𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?0 − ?̂?1𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
AM Model 3: ROA-Adjusted Model (Kothari et al. 2005) 
                                                          
3
 As our models for the examination of AM (and RM that follows) are estimated according to year and 
industry, we require a minimum of 8 observations for every 2-digit SIC code in every year (Cohen et 
al. 2008, Cohen and Zarowin 2010). 
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We first estimate cross-sectionally the following regression for all years according to 2-digit 
SIC codes: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1(𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, 
where 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  firm 𝑖’s Return on Assets, calculated as 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1, 
and all other variables as before. 
We then use the industry and year-specific parameter estimates 𝛾0, 𝛾1, 𝛾2 and 𝛾3 to calculate 
discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝛫𝑖,𝑡) by the Kothari et al. (2005) model via  
𝐷𝐴𝛫𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛾0 − 𝛾1(𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − 𝛾2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛾3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
For future reference, we define 𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = {𝐷𝐴𝑀𝐽𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷𝐴𝐽𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝐴𝛫𝑖,𝑡} as the set of discretionary 
accruals, estimated by the three models that are employed for the detection of accrual-based 
earnings management. 
We apply all three methods in order to assess the statistical significance of discretionary 
accruals, and where not reported, relevant results have been calculated as robustness checks.  
It should be noted that calculating the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals through 
the use of ROA-matched portfolios as in Zhao and Chen (2008) makes very little qualitative 
difference to the results.  
3.2 Detecting Real Earnings Management (RM) 
To test for the existence of RM, following previous research (Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et 
al. 2008, Cohen and Zarowin 2010), we examine whether firms reduce discretionary expenses 
or overproduce in order to affect earnings. Specifically, we examine whether firms have 
abnormally low discretionary expenses, and abnormally high production costs, where both 
tactics – overproduction and cutting discretionary costs – will have a positive effect on 
earnings. At this point, past research has also examined whether firms engage in sales 
manipulation (artificial sales increases) as an EM tactic, which should result in abnormally 
low cash flows from operations (CFO) (Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al. 2008, Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010). However, overproduction and artificial sales increases will have a negative 
effect on CFO, while reductions in discretionary expenses will have a positive and thus 
conflicting influence on CFO (Roychowdhury 2006). This is the reason, for example, that 
Zang (2012) does not explicitly employ abnormal CFO as a proxy for RM, and we follow her 
approach to avoid this conflicting result. On this point, Nwaeze et al. (2006) argue that debt 
might induce firms to manipulate CFO, and levered firms emphasise operating cash flows as a 
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performance measure or a device to relax financial constraints, given that creditors may set 
cash flow rather than profit goals for the issue of new debt. However, despite the fact that 
CFO creation ability could be a variable of interest for existing and potential debt holders, to 
avoid the interpretative problems observed for sales manipulation as a RM tactic, we only 
assess overproduction and reduction in discretionary expenses as RM tactics. 
Overproduction: We first express normal cost of goods sold (COGS) as a function of 
contemporaneous change in sales and estimate cross-sectionally the following regression for 
all years according to 2-digit SIC codes: 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡, 
 where  
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  firm 𝑖’s Cost of Goods Sold (#44) in year 𝑡, 
and all other variables as before. 
We then express normal inventory growth as a function of contemporaneous and past change 
in sales and estimate cross-sectionally the following regression for all years according to 2-
digit SIC codes:  
𝛥𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑑0 + 𝑑1𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑2𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 
where  
𝛥𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =  firm 𝑖’s change in Inventory (#3) between year 𝑡 − 1 and year 𝑡. 
Production costs, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡, are defined as the sum 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛥𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡, and normal production 
costs are defined using the following equation: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 
We then use the industry- and year-specific parameter estimates ?̂?0, ?̂?1, ?̂?2 and ?̂?3 to infer 
abnormal production costs (𝐴_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡): 
𝐴_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?0 − ?̂?1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?2𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?3𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 
Discretionary Expenses: We first express normal discretionary expenses as a function of past 
sales and estimate cross-sectionally the following regression for all years according to 2-digit 
SIC codes:  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
where 
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𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  the sum of firm 𝑖’s R&D (#46), Advertising expenses (#45) and Selling,  
  General and Administrative Expenses (SG&A) (#189) in year 𝑡, 
and all other variables as before. 
We then use the industry- and year-specific parameter estimates ?̂?0 and ?̂?1 to infer abnormal 
discretionary expenses costs (𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡): 
𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?0 − ?̂?1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 
All regression variables in the above equations for RM detection (including the constant 
terms) are scaled by Total Assets (#6) at the end of year. Cross-sectional regression 
estimation for capturing accruals-based (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994) or real earnings 
management (Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al. 2008, Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Gunny 
2010) follows directly from the literature.  
In addition, given that our hypotheses are focused on positive or upward EM depending on 
firm leverage, we additionally include one comprehensive measure for RM in our analysis, 
which combines the use of both RM tactics described above (discretionary expense 
manipulation and overproduction). Following the exact computational procedure of Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010), to calculate this measure, denoted RM1, we multiply abnormal 
discretionary expenses by minus one (so that the higher the amount, the greater the possibility 
that the firm is cutting discretionary expenses), and we add this to abnormal production costs. 
The multiplication of abnormal discretionary expenses by minus one also applies to all results 
subsequently reported for this RM proxy on a stand-alone basis. Thus, the higher the value of 
RM1, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in positive RM. We define here, for future 
reference, the set of real earnings management metrics 
𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = {𝐴_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑀1𝑖,𝑡} for all firm-years.  
4. Research Approach and Methodology 
4.1 Earnings Management by Suspect Firms and Potential Sample Bias 
Since the focus of this study is to investigate the effect of leverage on the empirically 
documented trade-off between the two earnings management approaches (AM and RM), our 
hypotheses in Section 2 are tested on a sample of firms where earnings management is likely 
to take place. As in previous research, it is expected that using a sample of firms that are 
suspected of implementing earnings management “increases the power of the tests of the 
trade-off decisions” (Zang 2012, p. 683). 
In accordance with the definitions and methodology employed by past research 
(Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al 2008, and mostly Zang 2012), we start with the population 
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of firms in Compustat between 1990 and 2009 (excluding firms from regulated industries, i.e., 
SIC codes between 4400-5000, and financials, SICs in 6000s) and consider suspect firms to 
be the ones falling into one of the following categories:  
(a) firms beating or meeting the zero-earnings benchmark, i.e., firm-year observations with 
earnings before extraordinary items over lagged total assets (Compustat items #18/lagged #6) 
between 0 and 0.5 %,  
(b) firms just beating/meeting previous-year earnings, i.e., firm-year observations with a 
change in basic EPS excluding extraordinary items (change in Compustat item EPSPX) from 
previous year between 0 and 2 cents, and  
(c) firms just beating/meeting analysts’ consensus forecasts, i.e., firm-year observations with 
actual EPS minus the last analysts’ consensus forecast provided in the I/B/E/S Database 
between 0 and 1 cent. 
Without imposing any other sample selection criteria until this point, the above criteria yield a 
total of 9,855 suspect firm-year observations during 1990-2009.
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Focusing our hypotheses testing on the (non-randomly selected) sample of EM suspect firm-
years that satisfy one of the above three criteria creates a potential omitted-variable problem, 
since the coefficients of any regression model estimated on such a non-randomly selected 
firm-year sample could be biased.
5
 As is standard in the treatment of such violations of the 
exogeneity requirement due to possibly omitted variables, we employ the Heckman (1979) 
two-step procedure to correct for the potential sample selection bias. In the first step of the 
procedure, known as the ‘selection equation’, the following probit model is estimated: 
𝑃𝑟[𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 1] = 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡𝜸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛷(𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐻𝑎𝑏𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛾3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾6,𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡)          (1) 
In the above, the dependent variable, 𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm 𝑖 
in year 𝑡 is suspect of earnings management (fulfils one of the criteria a-c above), and zero 
for non-suspect firm-years (see below for their definition). 𝛷(. ) denotes the cumulative 
                                                          
4
 In the sections that follow, the actual (usable) number of suspect firm-year observations decreases, as 
we further require that (a) at least one of our 𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 metrics (outlined in sections 3.1-3.2) can 
be computed for at least one year for each suspect firm, and (b) data for a number of control variables 
are available for our suspect firm-years. Section 5 provides a complete description of the sample 
selection procedure and detailed descriptive statistics. 
5
 As Vella (1998) points out, the omitted variables bias is probably the most commonly encountered 
problem in social and behavioural sciences, with self-selection one of the main common sources of this 
bias (see Wooldridge 2002). 
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distribution function of the standard normal distribution, 𝜸 is the vector of coefficients and 
𝒛𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of independent variables of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
Equation (1) is estimated on the union of two samples: the sample of suspect firm-years (see 
criteria a-c above) and a sample of non-suspect firm-years that is defined as in Zang (2012). 
Non-suspect firm-years are considered to be the ones falling into one of the following 
categories: 
(a) firms missing or beating the zero earnings benchmark by 2.5 percent of lagged total 
assets (Compustat item #18/lagged #6) or more, 
(b) firms missing or beating previous year EPS (change in Compustat item EPSPX) by more 
than 5 cents, and  
(c) firms missing or beating analyst’s consensus forecasts by more than 5 cents. 
Again, from the population of firms in Compustat between 1990 and 2009 (excluding firms 
from regulated industries and financials and without imposing any other data availability 
criteria until this point), there are 85,305 non-suspect firm-year observations. 
The choice of independent variables in equation (1) follows prior research on the factors 
which could potentially affect the incentive to beat or meet earnings targets.
6
 Specifically, 
𝐻𝑎𝑏𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  the number of times (with reference to the end of year 𝑡) that firm 𝑖 
has beaten or met the analysts’ consensus forecast (from I/B/E/S) in 
the past four quarters; 
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =  the log of 1 plus the number of analysts following firm 𝑖 as of the 
end of year 𝑡; 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  the log of the number of shares outstanding (#25) for firm 𝑖 at end 
of year 𝑡; 
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 =  the market-to-book ratio of firm 𝑖 at the beginning of year 𝑡, used 
as a proxy for firms’ growth opportunities. Market value is 
calculated by multiplying the closing price at fiscal year-end by the 
number shares outstanding, ((#199*#25)/#60); 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  is a proxy for firm profitability (Return on Assets), defined as 
income before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets (#18/#6) 
of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
(Compustat item # in parentheses where appropriate). 
                                                          
6
 For detailed analysis and justification for the inclusion of these variables in the first step of the 
Heckman (1979) approach, see Zang (2012), Chan et al. (2015) and the references therein. 
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The estimation of the selection equation (1) on the union of suspect and non-suspect firm-
years provides the non-selection hazard (what Heckman, 1979, referred to as the inverse 
Mill’s ratio, 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡) that augments our main regression equations to correct for potential 
selection bias.
7,8
 
4.2 The Effect of Leverage on the Trade-off between Real Earnings Management 
and Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
In order to test our hypotheses on the effect of leverage on the trade-off between RM and AM, 
we estimate the following recursive system of equations using the earnings management 
suspect firm-year sample: 
𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼2,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛼3,𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑀𝑙,𝑖,𝑡
𝑙
                      + ∑ 𝛼4,𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑚
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛽3,𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑀𝑙,𝑖,𝑡
𝑙
             + ∑ 𝛽4,𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑚
+ 𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
(2) 
The research approach follows directly from similar empirical investigations on the trade-off 
between different earnings management tactics (see Zang 2012) and the potential economic 
effect of variables on this trade-off (e.g., Chan et al. 2015, for clawback provisions, etc.). The 
measures of real activities manipulation 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = {𝐴_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑀1𝑖,𝑡} are 
                                                          
7
 Let 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?) denote the estimates from the probit selection equation (1). Then the inverse Mill’s ratio 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is estimated as 𝜑(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?)/𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?) for each suspect firm and is included in the second step 
equation of the Heckman (1979) procedure. 𝜑(. ) is the density of the standard normal distribution. 
8
 Our sample period begins in 1990 rather than in 1987 as in Zang (2012) and Roychowdjury (2006) 
because of data availability issues. In relation to how the numbers of observations for suspect firms 
reported by our study compare to relevant numbers reported by previous studies making use of 
approximately the same data set, our numbers are in line and closer to the ones reported by 
Roychowdjury (2006) rather than Zang (2012), when taking into account the sample period used by the 
respective studies. At the same time, all variables included in our analyses performed have been 
truncated at 1-99% on a variable-by-variable and year-by-year, while other studies make use of 
winsorising at 1-99% (Zang 2012, p. 689). Regarding numbers of observations reported for suspect 
firms by past research, in more detail, altogether, Roychowdhury (2006) identifies 503 suspect firm-
years during 1987-2001 by defining suspect firm years where they have Net Income/Total Assets >=0 
but ˂0.005, while Zang (2012), according to her first suspect-firm definition, defines suspects as firms 
just beating/meeting the zero benchmark, or firm-years with earnings before extraordinary items over 
lagged total assets between 0 and 0.5 percent, and finds 3,428 such firm-year observations (see Zang 
2012, p. 690 Table 2, Panel A, and also Table description) for a sample period extending from 1987 to 
2008. We make use of three (out of Zang’s four) definitions of ‘Suspect’ firm-years. Finally, our study 
follows a different approach when defining the ‘Suspect’ firm dependent variable in the probit model 
of Equation (1) in the first step of the Heckman procedure: Equation (1) is estimated on the union of 
two samples: the sample of suspect firm-years and a sample of non-suspect firm-years that is defined as 
in Zang (2012), while Zang (2012) reports that ‘The dependent variable in the selection model is 
Suspectt, which equals 1 if a firm just beats/meets one of the earnings benchmarks discussed above, 
and 0 otherwise.’  (Zang 2012, p.684). 
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expected to be negatively associated with their respective costs and positively affected by the 
costs associated with accrual-based earnings management (and vice-versa for 𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =
{𝐷𝐴𝑀𝐽𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷𝐴𝐽𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝐴𝛫𝑖,𝑡}). 
The system of equations above is recursive, in that the decisions of suspect firms to engage in 
AM and RM are sequential (and not simultaneous); real activities manipulation is executed 
and realised during the fiscal year, with accrual-based earnings management serving ‘fine-
tuning’ purposes based on the observed impact of RM after the year-end but before the 
release of financial statements. The substitutive relationship between real activities 
manipulation and accrual-based earnings management established by previous research 
predicts a negative sign for 𝛽5 in the 𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 equation of the system.
9
 
Our coefficients of interest in the above system (that follows largely from previous research) 
are 𝛼1, 𝛽1 and 𝛽6. Our hypothesis H1, that higher leverage (the 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 variable in the 
equations) and the stronger scrutiny by outside parties (auditors, regulators, and also debt and 
equity investors) which accompanies it makes firms prefer RM tactics (that are more difficult 
to detect) to AM, predicts a positive 𝛼1 and a non-positive 𝛽1 after controlling for the costs of 
managing earnings and other variables. Moreover, if leverage affects the substitutive 
relationship between AM and RM (our hypothesis H2), then 𝛽6, the coefficient of the 
interaction term 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡, should be significant, even after controlling for 
the individual effects of 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡. In addition, if our hypothesis H2 is 
true, that highly indebted firms suspected of managing their earnings might actually 
complement RM efforts with AM choices after the fiscal year-end, then the coefficient 𝛽6 
should be positive and significant. 
The variables used as proxies for the costs associated with RM and AM are based on Zang 
(2012); they are also employed as cost proxies by other studies on the topic (see Chan et al. 
2015). Costs associated with real earnings management are proxied by variables 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 = {𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡}. As firms that enjoy market 
leadership in an industry might perceive RM tactics as less threatening (costly) for their 
competitive advantage, we expect a suspect firm’s market share in its industry to be inversely 
related to its employment of RM tactics. We use 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡−1, at the beginning of year 𝑡, 
measured as the ratio of a company’s sales to the total sales of its industry (using three-digit 
SIC codes for industry definition) to capture this. Altman’s Z score (Altman 1968) at the 
beginning of year 𝑡, denoted 𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡−1, is also included as a cost proxy for RM. As in Zang 
                                                          
9
 Our maintained hypothesis that the decisions of suspect firms to engage in AM and RM are sequential 
in nature is confirmed by the results of a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) we conduct for the 
endogeneity of  𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡. To conserve space, we make the details and results of the test 
available upon request. 
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(2012), a firms’ financial health is expected to affect its use of RM tactics, with higher values 
of this score being indicative of stronger financial health, and thus lower costs associated with 
RM.
10
 Finally, we use a firm’s marginal tax rate at the end of the year, denoted 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑡, as a 
proxy for costs related to RM, with higher values for 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑡 indicating higher costs of real 
earnings management.
11
 
With respect to costs associated with AM activities, we use 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑡, a dummy variable equal to 
one if the auditor for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is one of the Big 4 auditing firms, and zero otherwise. 
This variable is expected to represent a proxy for the scrutiny of auditors and regulators, with 
higher scrutiny increasing the cost of engaging in AM activities. Moreover, as in previous 
research, we employ two variables that are expected to proxy for a firm’s flexibility within 
accounting systems. These variables are 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡−1, or Net operating assets at the beginning of 
the fiscal year, and 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑡−1, or a firm’s operating cycle at the beginning of the year. 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 
is a binary variable equal to 1 if net operating assets (stockholders’ equity minus cash and 
marketable securities plus total debt at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales, or 
(#216-#1+(#34 +#9))/(lagged #12) in Compustat items) are above the industry-year median 
(using 2-digit SIC codes for industry definition), and 0 otherwise. The operating cycle at the 
beginning of the year, 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑡−1, is computed as the number of days receivable plus the days 
inventory less the days payable at the beginning of the year (Net Trade Cycle Compustat item 
TRCYCLE). AM costs are expected to increase with overstated beginning-of-year 𝑁𝑂𝐴, as 
such an overstatement would limit the potential for AM during the current fiscal year. At the 
same time, a longer operating cycle would increase the potential for AM, in the presence of 
longer accounts and thus longer periods for accrual reversal (Zang 2012). 
 
Control variables included in (2) again follow from past research (Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 
2012; Chan et al. 2015). We include 𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑡 to proxy for a firm’s growth (variable computed 
as previously defined in Section 4.1). Imposing a control for growth is justified by the 
observation that firms with high growth may have a greater reluctance to report losses, while 
such firms may also have higher accruals than one would expect, compared to firms with 
lower than expected growth (McNichols 2000). We also employ proxies for profitability 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡, as defined in Section 4.1) and firm size (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡), with the latter calculated as the log 
                                                          
10
 We follow the approach by Graham et al. (2008) for 𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 calculation and do not include the ratio 
of market value of equity to book value of total debt, since a similar term, market-to-book, enters the 
system in (2) as a separate variable. 𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is calculated following Graham et al. (2008) as:  
(1.2*working capital+1.4*retained earnings+3.3* EBIT+0.999*sales)/total assets, or 
(1.2*#179+1.4*#36+3.3*#170+0.999*#12)/ #6. However, when Altman’s (1968) Z Score is employed 
out of the regression estimation context (e.g., with respect to definitions of distressed firms using cut 
off points in subsequent analyses), this term is included for the estimation of the Score, and in these 
cases the Score is denoted as ‘Altman’s 𝑍’.  
11
 We would like to thank Professor John Graham (Graham and Mills 2008, Graham 1996a, 1996b, 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/) for providing us with the data on MTR.  
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of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (log of #6). Such controls have been shown to 
significantly affect EM (in the case of RM, for example, see Roychowdhury, 2006, or Cohen 
et al., 2008). Finally, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) and include a proxy for inventories 
and receivables (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡, defined as the sum of inventories and receivables, scaled by 
total assets ((#3+#2)/#6) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡) in the RM regression, since firms with large 
inventories and receivables may have greater flexibility to engage in RM (Roychowdhury 
2006). 
In the system (2), leverage 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is defined following Roychowdhury (2006) and Dimitrov 
and Jain (2008) as the sum of short- and long-term debt, scaled by total assets, ((#34 +#9)/ 
(#6)). Change in leverage, 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡, when it appears in our empirical investigation later on, is 
defined as the difference between the end-of-year and the beginning-of-year values for 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡, 
following Dimitrov and Jain (2008). As in Zang (2012), in the accrual-based earnings 
management equation, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is measured as the residuals from the real earnings 
management equation, and the Heckman system of equations is estimated recursively, first 
equation (1) with the real earnings management equation as the Heckman second stage, and 
then equation (1) with the accrual-based earnings management equation. 
5. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
We make use of all firms from Compustat between 1990 and 2009, excluding firms from 
regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400-5000) and financials (SICs in 6000s). By 
applying our definitions of suspect and non-suspect firm-years (see Section 4.1) we identify 
9,855 suspect and 85,305 non-suspect potential firm-year observations. The number of firm-
year observations from this point onwards becomes data and test specific as we further require 
that firms have data available for the calculation of at least one of our AM and RM metrics 
and for the control variables defined in the previous section.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics (mean, median 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile values and 
standard deviation) for our sample suspect firm-years over 1990-2009. All variables are as 
defined in the previous sections and are truncated at percentiles 1% and 99% to mitigate the 
possibility of extreme observations distorting our results.
12
 For comparability purposes with 
other RM measures, the proxy for abnormal discretionary expenses (A_DISEXP) has been 
multiplied by minus one, so that the higher the value of this variable, the greater the 
possibility of a firm engaging in upward RM. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
                                                          
12
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is actually truncated at 1% and 98% to eliminate a few observations (about twenty) with a 
leverage ratio in excess of 10. 
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Descriptive statistics, for leverage medians, generally confirm the values obtained by previous 
studies in the field (Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al. 2008): the median leverage ratio is 
21.75%, close to median values obtained, for example, for a less restricted sample by Cohen 
et al. (2008). Our sample suspect firms further exhibit a median operating cycle of about 74 
days, and the sum of inventories and receivables represent 32.20% of total assets (using 
median values), with profitability, on average, positive, as median income to total assets 
(ROA) is equal to 5.7%. Suspect firms exhibit a modified (four-factor, as described in Section 
4.2) Z Score of 2.1158 (1.7264 using mean values), while they appear to have met or beaten 
analysts’ consensus forecasts for the past 2.6734 out of four preceding quarters. Interestingly, 
mean and median changes in leverage are negative during our sample period, indicating minor 
decreases in the debt carried by our sample suspect firms. Our suspect firm median share of 
sales volume relative to same industry peers (MarketShare) is observed to be 2.53% (7.7% 
using mean values), with 55.20% of the firms having NOA above their industry median, and 
92% audited by a BIG4 auditing firm. Marginal tax rates are observed to be around 23% on 
average, or 34% using median values.  
All signed discretionary accrual measures exhibit positive values between 0.35% to 2.6% of 
total assets for medians, and 5.3% to 13.5% using means. This finding could be considered to 
be broadly in accordance with previous research observing average DA values around zero at 
the sample level (Cohen et al. 2008), which would be the expectation for sample average 
behaviour. Still, the values we observe are on average positive and slightly greater than zero, 
which could be considered indicative of a possible tendency for upward AM by our sample of 
suspect firms. Median abnormal discretionary expenses and production costs are also very 
close to zero on average for our sample of suspect firms, indicating that overall, year and 
industry controls explain to a significant extent firm expenses and production costs. With 
respect to RM1, median and especially mean values are positive and higher than zero, as RM1 
takes values of about 0.04 using means and 0.02 using medians, which is broadly indicative of 
a tendency for upward EM by our suspect sample firms. Descriptive statistics for non-suspect 
firm-year observations are almost identical and we make them available upon request in order 
to save space. 
Table 2 reports pair-wise correlation coefficients between accrual-based earnings 
management measures and real earnings management measures for all sample suspect firms. 
Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the main diagonal and Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients are reported below the main diagonal. (A_DISEXP) has been 
multiplied by negative one as in results reported in Table 1.  
Insert Table 2 here. 
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Correlations observed in Table 2 generally confirm statistical findings by previous studies, 
e.g., Cohen and Zarowin (2010) or Roychowdhury (2006). Correlation coefficients fall 
between 85-90% or higher for DA estimated under the Jones vs. Modified Jones models, and 
between roughly 60% to 80% for Jones DA and Modified Jones DA versus DA estimated 
under the Kothari et al. (2005) ROA adjustment approach. Correlations between A_PROD 
and accruals are positive and significant, and the same applies for correlations between DA 
and A_DISEXP. All results for our suspect firm sample are consistent with Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010).
13
 Finally, upward RM metric RM1 positively and significantly correlates 
with accruals, indicating, without undertaking more detailed analysis until this point, that 
there exists for our sample suspect firms a possibility for RM to coexist to a certain extent 
with AM.  
6. Empirical Findings 
6.1 Assessing the Impact of Leverage on AM and RM: Portfolio Analysis 
To examine the impact of firm leverage (both different levels of, and changes in, leverage) on 
AM and RM, we first examine the median values of AM and RM measures (and their 
statistical significance) for different leverage portfolios. Each year we construct five 
portfolios based on the leverage or change in leverage of suspect firms and record the AM and 
RM measures of the firms in each portfolio. For our sample of suspect firms, Table 3 reports 
portfolio medians of accrual-based and real earnings management measures, for five 
annually-rebalanced portfolios of leverage (Panel A) and change in leverage (Panel B). In 
both Panels, Portfolio 1 consists of the firms with the lowest 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  or 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 in every year, 
while Portfolio 5 consists of the firms with the highest.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
We observe from Table 3 Panel A that under the Jones and Modified Jones DA estimation 
models, median DA tend to decrease as we move on from lower to higher leverage portfolios, 
while median accruals are positively significant for the all debt portfolios. However, we do 
not observe any such tendency in the case of DA estimated under the Kothari et al. (2005) 
approach. At the same time, we witness no significant difference in DA experienced between 
the lowest and highest leverage portfolio for all DA model specifications, which is considered 
overall indicative of no significant trends with respect to AM behaviour as levels of leverage 
increase in this univariate sorting.   
Results from Table 3 Panel A exhibit opposite trends for RM metrics as we move from lower 
to higher leverage portfolios for suspect firms. Specifically, abnormal discretionary expenses 
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 For a detailed economic rationale of the correlations between AM and RM metrics, see Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010, p. 9).  
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(multiplied by minus one, so that higher values indicate upward RM) get negative values for 
the two bottom debt portfolios (with the value of the bottom leverage portfolio also 
statistically significant at 1%), and positively significant values for the three top debt 
portfolios. In the case of abnormal production costs, they are negative and significant for the 
two lowest leverage portfolios, and they obtain positively significant values for the top debt 
portfolio. Results are further confirmed for the comprehensive RM indicator RM1. RM1 
obtains negatively significant values for the two bottom debt portfolios, while its values 
increase and are consistently positive and significant at the 1% level for the three higher 
leverage portfolios. At the same time, for all of A_PROD, A_DISEXP, and RM1, we obtain 
evidence of strongly significant differences between the bottom and top leverage portfolios, 
indicating higher values of RM1, A_PROD, and A_DISEXP when comparing the top to the 
bottom leverage portfolio.    
Findings from Table 3 Panel B do not overall contradict the direction of results observed from 
Panel A in the case of leverage changes as well. Specifically, we receive indications of 
downward EM using overproduction as a tool, as the two bottom leverage change portfolios 
get negative and significant values for A_PROD, with no statistical significance observed for 
the top debt change portfolios for this variable. RM1 also appears to get higher values for 
higher leverage change portfolios, and, most importantly, again for all of A_PROD, 
A_DISEXP, and RM1, we get evidence of strongly significant differences between the 
bottom and top leverage change portfolios, indicating higher values of RM1, A_PROD, and 
A_DISEXP when comparing the top to the bottom change in leverage portfolios. With regard 
to the behaviour of DA as changes in leverage get higher, we do not get any observable trend 
or association between DA and changes in leverage for either model specification used. 
However, we do get evidence of the existence of a significantly positive difference in DA 
experienced between the lowest and highest leverage portfolio for all DA model 
specifications, which is interestingly indicative of upward AM taking place in the top – 
compared to the bottom – change in leverage portfolio.14 
Overall, the behaviour of all RM metrics, individual as well as comprehensive, from Table 3 
Panels A and B indicates a trend for firms to engage in significant upward RM as debt levels 
increase, or in the presence of leverage increases, providing confirmation of our first research 
hypothesis H1 on higher leverage levels and changes inducing a preference for RM. In the 
case of AM, there is no trend observed with respect to the behaviour of DA as debt levels 
increase, and what is observed is that high debt is clearly not accompanied by income-
increasing AM. However, we do obtain some evidence on the existence of upward AM for 
                                                          
14
 Findings from Table 3 (both Panels) remain qualitatively similar when means instead of medians are 
used, although results (not reported here) are more sensitive to the existence of extreme values. Neither 
does experimenting with different numbers (3 or 10, etc.) of leverage/leverage change portfolios seem 
to affect the nature of the results in Table 3. 
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firms experiencing very high, as opposed to very low, debt changes. Without any evidence on 
causality between leverage and EM, portfolio analysis until this point indicates that high 
levels of debt or changes in debt coincide with higher positive real earnings manipulation, but 
do not go hand in hand with upward AM in the case of higher debt levels, consistent with our 
hypotheses. However, we do get some evidence on upward AM for firms experiencing 
exceptionally strong leverage changes.    
A counter argument at this point could be that highly levered firms may experience large 
negative accruals due to financial trouble (in line with DeAngelo et al. 1994). In this case, the 
negative accruals observed for highly indebted firms would be simply reflecting bad 
performance, rather than AM. However, more financially weak firms have been hypothesised 
to have greater incentives for AM rather than RM, as the cost of deviating from an optimal 
business strategy is high for these firms (Zang 2012). If firms with poor financial health 
prefered upward AM, the relevant finding which would confirm such behaviour would be the 
detection of positive rather than negative DA for these firms. This is not what we find for 
highly indebted firms, even with the use of accruals which impose some control for firm 
performance (the Kothari et al. 2005 model).   
One could additionally argue here that in the presence of high levels of debt, tight business 
circumstances could be mistaken for RM, because, for example, firms might exhibit 
overproduction due to missed demand targets, or decrease discretionary expenses if they face 
tight debt covenants (Kim et al. 2011). However, our evidence on positive RM is not limited 
to the most highly indebted firms; rather, it is present in all portfolios in general, as one 
compares lower vs. higher debt or change in debt. Of course, there is only a limited number of 
conclusions that can be reached from the one-sort portfolio analysis of this section. Our 
regression analysis that follows attempts to investigate the effect of leverage on the 
substitution between AM and RM tactics, after controlling for a number of factors, including 
financial distress, bad performance or tight industry competition. 
It is worth pointing out the contrary effects at hand here. On the one hand, high leverage 
should be increasing the costs of AM (due to higher outsider scrutiny), thus making RM more 
probable than AM. On the other hand, however, high leverage could very easily be 
accompanied by poor financial health, where poor financial health according to Zang (2012) 
should increase the costs of RM, thus making AM more probable than RM. In this context, 
the question raised is whether, in the presence of high financial leverage, the expected 
decreasing effect on RM stemming from the ‘financial health’ factor is/is not stronger than the 
expected increasing effect on RM stemming from the ‘external scrutiny’ factor. 
To provide a reply to this question, we have repeated the analysis from Table 3 by re-
calculating the statistical significance of mean/median proxies for AM and RM for distressed 
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suspect vs. healthy suspect firms with different levels of financial leverage.
15
 Following 
Pryshchepa et al. (2013), distressed firms are considered to be the ones with Altman’s Z score 
(𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡) values <1.81, healthy firms the ones with Altman’s Z Score values above or equal to 
1.81. Relevant results are reported in Table 4, after grouping these firms into one of five 
leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) annually rebalanced portfolios. (𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) has been multiplied by 
negative one as discussed in Section 3.2. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
The purpose of this analysis is to first track the RM and AM patterns of highly leveraged 
firms with poorer vs. better financial health. In this case, our purpose is to examine whether 
highly levered firms with better vs. worse financial health differentiate their patterns of use of 
AM vs. RM, given that low financial health is expected to increase the costs of RM, and thus 
make AM more probable. At the same time, by repeating this analysis for different leverage 
quintiles for distressed vs. healthy firms, we examine whether the level of financial leverage 
combined with financial health plays any role in the level of AM and RM undertaken by 
firms.  
Results from Table 4 indicate a significant tendency of financially healthy firms to engage in 
upward RM as financial leverage increases, with this tendency not confirmed for distressed 
firms, with the exception of results on abnormal discretionary expenses. However, as this 
result for distressed firms is observed only for A_DISEXP and not for any other RM proxy, 
this could be representative of an effort of such firms to cut costs, rather than indicative of 
RM. At the same time, in the case of AM, we do not observe any monotonic significant 
association between AM and differing levels of leverage, depending on whether a firm is 
considered to be distressed or not. The only weak exception to this finding is evidence on 
significantly less upward AM when comparing healthy firms from the top vs. bottom leverage 
portfolio for DA calculated under the Jones (2991) model, confirming less upward AM as 
leverage increases for this group. Overall, results from Table 4 Panel A indicate that for a 
suspect firm to be expected to exhibit the AM vs. RM patterns observed in Table 3 for higher 
vs. lower levels of leverage, in accordance with our first research hypothesis H1, it must not 
be a financially distressed firm.   
Results from Table 4 overall indicate that financially healthy and more strongly leveraged 
firms will show a greater preference towards RM - confirming our first hypothesis H1 
regarding a relative preference for RM as financial leverage increases - compared to 
counterparts with lower leverage. Stronger vs. weaker financial health is observed to reinforce 
the preference towards RM, in accordance with Zang (2012). This finding is not confirmed 
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 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pinpointing this subtle point and making a 
detailed and specific suggestion for the type of analysis to follow in order to address this concern.  
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for distressed firms, so we have here indications that the expected decreasing effect on RM 
stemming from the ‘financial health’ factor is indeed stronger than the expected RM-
increasing ‘external scrutiny’ effect if a suspect firm is financially distressed.16   
6.2 Assessing the Impact of Leverage on AM and RM: Regression Analysis 
The portfolio analysis of the previous section merely indicates that in the case of suspect 
firms, high levels of debt or changes in debt coincide with higher positive real earnings 
manipulation, but do not necessarily coincide with upward accrual-based earnings 
management. Thus, it provides an indication which cannot be regarded as evidence, in the 
absence of additional controls. We therefore proceed with the recursive system analysis of 
equations (1) and (2) outlined in Section 4, that simultaneously controls for the costs 
associated with both earnings management tactics, as well as other variables.   
Panel A of Table 5 summarises the estimation results of equation (1), the first stage of the 
Heckman procedure, while Panel B of Table 5 summarises the results of the system in (2), the 
Heckman second stage set of equations.  
Insert Table 5 here. 
We observe from the probit first stage results in Panel A that overall, the statistical 
significance of factors expected to influence the possibility of a firm becoming suspect of 
meeting or beating earnings targets generally conforms to past research: habitual beaters, 
firms feeling more pressure from monitoring by analysts or having greater numbers of shares 
outstanding (as missing earnings-per-share targets usually translates to more dollars of 
earning shortages for these firms) are the ones which should be significantly expected to be 
suspect firms for our sample. In contrast, however, to past research, we do not observe a 
significant influence of the market-to-book ratio or of profitability, on just meeting/beating 
earnings targets.  
The first stage of the Heckman procedure provides the inverse Mill’s ratio (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡) that is 
included in the second stage (eq. 2) as a control variable to account for the potential omitted 
variable problem caused by the non-random nature of our suspect firms sample. Table 5 Panel 
B summarises the estimation results of the second stage for RM and AM respectively, under 
the expectation that RM precedes AM and AM depends on unexpected levels of RM 
undertaken during the year, by accounting for cost and benefits for both AM and RM, as well 
as control factors expected to play a role in firms’ decision to engage in EM. We first observe 
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 Untabulated results for the analysis reported on Table 4 for changes in leverage are weaker when 
contrasting AM and RM patterns for distressed vs. healthier firms, indicating that the relative financial 
health of firms in relation to changes experienced in leverage does not have such a strong impact on the 
choice of suspect firms to engage in  RM vs. AM. Results from
 
Table 4 are qualitatively similar when 
defining healthy firms as the ones with an Altman’s Z score value over 2.99.  
32 
 
from Table 5 Panel B that levels of leverage have a positive and significant (at 10% level) 
effect on RM, but no significant effect on RM, consistent with our first hypothesis H1 on a 
stronger association between leverage and RM rather than AM.  
Moreover, we do confirm evidence by Zang (2012) on a substitution effect between 
unexpected levels of RM and AM, given the sign and significance of the relevant coefficient 
for 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 . Most interestingly, though, we find that the multiplicative term 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 significantly and positively relates to AM. In line with our 
second research hypothesis H2, the coefficient of the interaction term is significant even at the 
1% level, indicating that high leverage strongly affects the substitution effect between RM 
and AM that is established by past research (Zang 2012) for suspect firms. Importantly, a 
Wald test that is reported in Panel B on the null hypothesis that 𝛽5 + 𝛽6 × 𝐿𝑒?̃? ≤ 0, i.e. the 
effect of  𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 for a firm of median leverage 𝐿𝑒?̃? turns from negative (𝛽5) to 
positive, is clearly rejected at any significance level. In line with our hypothesis H2, the 
negative association between unexpected RM and AM turns positive, thus transforming a 
substitution into a complementarity effect for higher levels of leverage. In other words, the 
presence of high leverage, and the expected monitoring that this has been hypothesised to 
induce, should be expected to make firms complement AM with RM in an effort to achieve 
earnings targets, rather than be able to substitute one form of EM with the other in order to 
attain a specific target.  
With respect to the behaviour of the variables used as proxies for cost of AM or RM and 
control variables, we overall observe some statistical significance. For costs of AM, NOA is 
found to negatively and significantly relate to AM, as expected, with no observed significance 
for any other variable. With respect to control variables, the profitability proxy ROA is found 
to negatively associate to both forms of AM, an indication that EM is undertaken in the 
presence of performance pressures. At the same time, size and the level of inventories and 
receivables (Assets and INVRECTA) are found to positively relate to RM, and market-to-
book to negatively do so, implying that RM should be more prevalent among larger firms and 
firms with more inventory and receivables (in accordance with the expectation that large 
inventories and receivables may provide higher flexibility to engage in RM according to 
Roychowdhury 2006) and firms with lower growth. However, none of these control variables 
is observed to exhibit any statistical significance in the AM equation. At the same time, we 
observe that the inverse Mill’s ratio (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is highly significant in the RM equation, but 
very insignificant in the AM equation, indicating that suspect firm status has a significant 
(and positive) effect on undertaking RM but not AM. This is consistent with suspect firms 
being more prone to engage in RM rather than AM, the latter being generally considered to be 
more easily scrutinised by parties outside the firm. Moreover, the variance inflation factors 
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for selected independent variables that are reported in Panel B are very low, suggesting that 
no multicollinearity problems plague our specifications.
17
  
To further assess the effects of leverage and RM (and their interaction) on the 
substitution/complementarity of earnings management tactics, we re-estimate the second stage 
of the Heckman procedure by replacing the leverage continuous variable 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 wherever it 
appears (as a stand-alone regressor or in the interaction term) with the sum of five 
multiplicative terms 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞, 𝑞 = {1,2,3,4,5}. The indicator function 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞 
takes the value of one if the leverage of suspect firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 belongs to the 𝑞𝑡ℎ leverage 
quantile over the sample period, and zero otherwise.
18
 This re-estimation, the results of which 
are summarised in Table 6, is performed in order to account for the effect of different levels 
of leverage on the substitution of AM with RM and to investigate whether the 
complementarity effect observed in the results of Table 5 is uniform across all leverage levels. 
Insert Table 6 here. 
We observe from the results reported in Table 6 that in three out of five cases, (corresponding 
to relevant leverage quintile indicator variables), including the highest two leverage 
portfolios, the multiplicative term 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞 is both positive and statistically 
significant, while the same variable shows no signs of significance in the AM regression. This 
finding confirms our first research hypothesis H1, but this time by taking into account 
differing amounts of leverage. Unexpected RM is again negatively significant in the AM 
regression, while this variable multiplied by 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞 is observed to be 
statistically significant and positive only in the case of the highest leverage portfolio. This 
latter is in complete accordance with H2 and is further confirmed by the reported Wald test on 
the combined effect of unexpected RM for the top leverage quintile (the only one reported for 
the sake of brevity). In this way, taken as a whole, results from Tables 5 and 6 indicate that 
leverage plays a role in the determination of RM but not AM. At the same time, leverage will 
tend to turn the trade-off observed by past research between unexpected levels of RM and RM 
into a complementarity effect, in a need to combine both forms of EM in order to achieve 
earnings targets, with this result mainly driven by firms with the highest levels of leverage, 
that is, firms expected to induce the highest levels of scrutiny and monitoring by outside 
interest groups.  
We repeat the analysis for different levels of leverage, this time for changes in leverage 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡. Table 7 reports results of an analysis similar to that of Table 6, this time replacing the 
five quintile indicators of 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 with relevant quintile indicators 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞 for changes in 
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 Multicollinearity is considered to be low when the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below a rule-
of-thumb threshold value of 10 (see for example Chatterjee and Hadi 2012). 
18
 The first stage Heckman equation is the same as in Table 5. 
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leverage (𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡) (from lowest to highest), and multiplying these variables with the change in 
leverage indicator and the Unexpected RM proxy.  
Insert Table 7 here. 
We observe from Table 7 that the change in leverage variable, multiplied by dummy variables 
indicative of change in leverage magnitude (𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞 , 𝑞 = {1,2,3,4,5}), is 
positive and statistically significant at 5% level only in the case of the top 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 portfolio in 
the RM regression, indicating that very strong changes in leverage do induce upward RM. 
This is not the case, however, for lower leverage changes. Thus, our first research Hypothesis 
H1 is confirmed for changes, in addition to levels of leverage. The 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑡 
regressor is again negatively significant in the AM equation in the case of the changes results, 
as has been the case for Tables 5 and 6 for levels, indicating a trade-off between unexpected 
RM and AM in general. Interestingly, while none of the 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 1𝑡𝑜 5  regressors 
is significant for any of the lower 4 change in leverage portfolios in the AM regression, this 
multiplicative term is negatively significant for the top 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 portfolio in the AM equation, 
indicating that high leverage changes negatively affect the choice to proceed with AM. This 
result is qualitatively opposite from the relevant result for RM in the presence of significant 
leverage changes. At the same time, in the case of the AM equation, we observe that again the 
multiplicative term 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 1 𝑡𝑜 5 is positively statistically 
significant only for the top change-in-leverage portfolio This is indicative that very high 
changes in leverage (but not changes of lower magnitude) induce a complementarity effect 
between unexpected RM and AM, as has been the case for very high levels of leverage, 
providing further confirmation for H2 in the case of changes in leverage. With respect to the 
behaviour of the rest of regressors, this is in the same direction as for relevant results from 
Tables 5 and 6 for levels of debt.  
Findings from Tables 3 to 7 for firms suspect of having managed earnings in an effort to 
achieve earnings targets are overall indicative of higher vs. lower levels of leverage (or 
changes in leverage) being associated with higher EM based on real transactions, and no 
obvious or significant AM behaviour pattern depending on different levels or changes in debt. 
Regression analysis further explicitly indicates that very high (but not lower) levels of 
leverage (and changes in leverage) positively and significantly affect the decision to engage in 
RM The relevant association between debt levels and changes and AM are not so clear or 
overall significant (with the exception of strong changes in leverage, negatively and 
significantly relating to levels of AM). At the same time, we do confirm the existence of a 
trade-off between higher levels of unexpected RM undertaken during the whole financial year 
and AM in accordance with past research (Zang 2012). However, our findings are consistent 
with this substitution effect turning into a complementarity effect between unexpected RM 
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and AM for firms experiencing the highest levels or changes in debt. In this respect, both our 
hypotheses H1 and H2 are observed to be confirmed by findings reported in Tables 3 to 7 
following evidence of a positive and significant association between leverage levels (and 
changes) and RM, a non-significant effect of leverage levels on AM, and a significant 
complementarity effect observed between AM and unexpected levels of RM observed for the 
most highly levered firms. We interpret the latter finding as indicative of firms 
complementing AM with RM in an effort to achieve earnings targets in the presence of strong 
leverage levels and changes, as the expected monitoring that a strong presence of debt has 
been hypothesised to induce puts firms in a position where they have to complement, rather 
than being able to substitute, one form of EM with the other in an effort to attain a specific 
target for its earnings.  
6.3 The Impact of EM and Different Levels of Leverage and Changes in Leverage on 
Subsequent Market Performance 
To examine the association between earnings management, different levels of debt, as well as 
debt changes, and subsequent market performance, we need an empirical setting 
simultaneously controlling for levels of debt and EM. We therefore construct 9 portfolios for 
each year for our sample firms, using (a) firms’ leverage and (b) firms’ earnings management 
(real and accrual-based) metrics, for observations falling into the bottom 30%, middle 40% or 
top 30% of total suspect firm-year observations. For each portfolio that is formed every year t, 
we record its equally-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a period that 
starts in April of year t+1 and lasts for l months (i.e., an l-month window). We leave a four-
month period after the fiscal year-end before calculating BHARs for the public announcement 
of financial results to take place. With respect to the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
calculation, we follow Barber and Lyon (1997) and define BHARs as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑙 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑙
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡)
𝑙
𝑡=1 .  (3) 
Each suspect firm is matched each sample year with a control firm of similar size and book-
to-market ratio as outlined in Barber and Lyon (1997), and the control firm’s buy-and-hold 
return acts as the benchmark return in equation (3) of the text.
19
 Data on firm monthly stock 
returns (including dividends), book-to-market ratios and market values are downloaded from 
CRSP. 
In Table 8, we report median 3, 12 and 24-month-ahead BHARs of the 9 leverage and EM 
metrics portfolios (l = 3, 12 and 24 in Panels A, B, and C of the Table, respectively, from 
                                                          
19 As Barber and Lyon (1997, p.370) point out, matching sample firms to control firms on specified 
firm characteristics such as size and book-to-market alleviates known biases in abnormal return 
calculation (such as the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias, and the skewness bias), especially for 
longer time horizons. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for underlining this last point.  
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April t+1). The EM metrics used are RM1i,t for real earnings management and discretionary 
accruals under the Modified Jones specification are used as proxies for AM. Table 8 also 
reports the statistical significance of median portfolio returns. In addition, in rows/columns 
entitled H0: Equal Medians, we report (‘high’ minus ‘low’) portfolio BHAR differences in 
medians, with z-statistics from Wilcoxon rank sum tests (under the null hypothesis that 
Portfolios 3 and 1 are from distributions with equal medians) in square brackets. 
Insert Table 8 here. 
We observe from the results of Table 8 that RM in relation to levels of leverage does not 
appear to be consistently associated with any significant effect on abnormal market 
performance, for all 3-, 12- and 24-month investment windows. The tests for the equality of 
medians between the bottom and top RM portfolio for a given level of leverage indicate 
confirmation that performance is actually comparable between them. The same generally 
applies to the tests of median equality between the ‘low’ and ‘high’ leverage portfolios, for 
any given level of RM. So, positive RM in relation to leverage does not seem to result in 
consistent differences between firms in terms of stock market performance, for the following 
3 to 24 months.   
However, the contrary appears to be the case with respect to AM and leverage portfolios, at 
least in the short-run. We observe a tendency for significant deterioration of performance as 
we move from lower to higher AM portfolios, keeping levels of leverage constant for the 3-
month return window in Panel A of the Table. The differences in stock performance between 
the bottom and top AM portfolios for any given level of leverage are in every case significant 
for the 3-month window, indicating that for a given level of leverage, a firm engaging in 
upward AM will perform worse than a firm not doing so, i.e., the market is found to penalise 
for this behaviour, on a risk-adjusted basis over the next three months following financial 
reporting. However, we do not observe such a pattern for returns from the 12-month window 
onwards, indicating that the market should have fully incorporated information on EM by that 
time, resulting in no further penalisation of higher AM firms for a given level of leverage. 
Regarding patterns in returns as we move from lower to higher leverage portfolios for a given 
level of AM, overall we do not observe any significant or trend-indicating pattern. Finally, a 
casual comparison permits one to observe that when significant, differences in the level of 
BHARs for firms with a given level of leverage are larger (in absolute terms) for AM 
compared to RM. As a whole, results for AM indicate that investors tend to heavily penalise 
for the use of AM at least in the short run, but not for RM. This relative absence of 
penalisation for RM confirms our third hypothesis H3, which expects greater difficulties in 
detection of RM vs. AM undertaken in relation to leverage. This evidence is interpreted as a 
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possible indication of the ability of investors to see through AM tactics, particularly for 
shorter time horizons. 
In Table A1 of Appendix A, we repeat the analysis reported in Table 4 for AM and RM in 
relation to leverage levels as well as financial health, by tracking this time the market 
performance for sample (suspect) firms with Altman’s Z score (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡) values <1.81 
(‘Distressed firms’) and Z Score values above 1.81 (‘Healthy firms’), grouped into one of five 
leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) annually rebalanced portfolios. Market performance is estimated for the next 
3, 12 and 24 months after portfolio formation using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). 
The scope of this analysis is to examine whether financial health plays a differential role with 
respect to market appraisal in the presence of different levels of leverage, and especially, high 
financial leverage, and in this way track the market performance of firms with differing levels 
of leverage examined in Table 4.  
We generally observe from Table A1 in Appendix A that for a given level of leverage, market 
performance tends to be significantly stronger for more vs. less financially healthy firms, and 
this result tends to hold for all time windows examined. At the same time, more (vs. less) 
financially healthy, highly-levered firms tend to have significantly higher returns over the 
next 3, 12 and 24 months after portfolio formation, which is consistent with market 
participants compensating for good financial performance through their market return 
formation patterns. A notable exception to these findings is the significantly higher return for 
the most levered distressed firms, in comparison to healthy ones, for the shorter (3-month) 
time window examined. This result reverses for the 12 and 24-month time windows, and is 
interpreted as an indication of market compensation for highly levered and distressed firms’ 
risk in the short-term, with the relevant result dissipating for longer time windows, over which 
financial health is more positively compensated.   
Table 9 finally reports median 3-, 12- and 24-month BHARs for 9 change-in-leverage and 
EM metrics portfolios (l = 3, 12 and 24 in Panels A, B, and C of the Table, respectively, from 
April t+1). The EM metrics used are again RM1i,t for RM and discretionary accruals under 
the Modified Jones specification are used as proxies for AM 
Insert Table 9 here. 
Results from Table 8 on the behaviour of stock returns depending on different levels of 
leverage and EM levels are generally confirmed from Table 9 in the case of changes in 
leverage, providing support for our third hypothesis H3 of changes in leverage, in addition to 
levels, inducing AM as opposed to RM by EM suspect firms. RM in relation to leverage 
changes does not appear to be consistently associated with any significant effect on market 
performance, for any investment horizon. In the case of AM, however, we observe the same 
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type of difference to be consistently statistically significant (and negative) for the 3-month 
return window.
20
 
Overall, the findings of the portfolio analysis from Tables 8 and 9 confirm our third research 
hypothesis H3 and suggest that investors appear to more heavily and readily penalise accrual-
based debt-induced EM. The stock market reaction to real EM, which is expected to be more 
difficult to detect, is not significantly negative in relation to observed differences in levels of 
leverage or changes in debt. In the case of stock market reaction to AM by market 
participants, however, we observe a significant penalisation of AM for a given level of change 
in leverage, indicating that equity investors may manage to see through high levels of AM for 
a given level or change in leverage, and negatively price such actions through return 
formation.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we examine whether the level of, and increases in, financial leverage have an 
impact on the use of accrual-based and real earnings management tactics. We hypothesise that 
in cases where firms engage in EM in order to achieve earnings targets in the presence of 
significant levels of debt or large increases in debt, RM should be their preferred choice 
because of a lower possibility - and subsequent costs - of getting caught, given that RM does 
not involve accrual manipulation but can rather ‘be masked’ in the form of everyday 
transactions. According to the control hypothesis by Jensen (1986), leverage should be 
expected to bring increased monitoring and scrutiny on the part of outside creditors, with this 
expectation equally extrapolated to any outside party with an investment interest in the firm, 
including equity investors interested in assessing firms’ risk profiles.   
We use all non-financial firms from Compustat during 1990-2009 and first establish that 
higher levels of leverage (or changes in leverage) positively and significantly associate with 
higher levels of upward RM. However, we observe no relevant evidence for the existence of 
upward AM in the presence of higher levels of debt or changes in such, while these 
conclusions are deduced for all firms with an assumed motivation to engage in EM in order to 
avoid reporting a loss, or a decrease in earnings from previous year levels, or miss an earnings 
target set by financial analysts. We then confirm that AM is undertaken sequentially to RM, 
confirming past research (Zang 2012, Chan et al. 2015), and implement regression analysis 
pointing towards leverage (levels and changes) having a significantly positive effect on RM, 
but no significant influence on AM, with the former effect being stronger for higher levels of 
leverage. Most interestingly, our findings indicate the existence of a complementarity effect 
                                                          
20
 Untabulated results are qualitatively the same with the use of means, for both Tables 8 and 9. 
(Untabulated) results when using a 6-month window are qualitatively similar (although weaker) in 
comparison to results for the 3-month window, for both Tables 8 and 9.  
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between unexpected levels of RM and AM, which becomes very strong in the case of highly 
indebted firms (or firms experiencing very high leverage changes). We thus provide evidence 
that in the presence of high levels of leverage (or changes in debt), the trade-off effect 
between RM and AM (Zang 2012) turns into a complementarity effect. This evidence is 
interpreted as an indication that very high leverage is accompanied by strong outsider 
scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use RM in combination with AM to be able to 
achieve earnings targets.  
We additionally examine the impact of leverage-induced RM and AM on the perceptions of 
investors regarding suspect firms, which are assumed to materialise through market appraisal 
in the case of equity investors, in an effort to assess whether market pricing can see through 
EM practices. Our focus on the consequences of leverage-induced EM is based on the 
investor group whose reaction should be the quickest to capture, that is, equity investors. We 
assess buy-and-hold abnormal returns for double-sorted portfolios formed on the basis of the 
amount of firm AM or RM metrics observed in a given year and the level of firm leverage 
(and leverage change) in that year, and find evidence that for a given level of leverage, there 
exists a significantly negative association between AM and subsequent stock returns in the 3 
months after portfolio formation, while this phenomenon is observed to dissipate for horizons 
of one year and beyond. In contrast, firms using income-increasing RM when compared to 
firms with equal debt burdens that refrain from RM are found to have indistinguishable stock 
market performance over the subsequent 3 to 24 months, while all previous findings hold 
when repeating the analysis for changes in leverage. These findings lead to the conclusion 
that stock market investors appear to penalise more heavily and readily debt-induced AM 
rather than RM, which is interpreted as an indication that AM can be more easily detected 
than RM.   
Our study contributes to past research by providing evidence for the first time that leverage 
and changes in leverage have a significantly positive impact on upward RM as opposed to 
AM for firms with earnings targets in place. These findings provide evidence that an 
environment of increased monitoring and scrutiny indeed supports a preference for RM over 
AM. However, the main difference between the debt and equity capital providers lies in the 
fact that, in contrast to shareholders, even if investment risks increase, debt-holders are not 
residual claimants and are by definition more concerned with receiving repayment of their 
capital and interest, rather than maximising the value of the firm. Consequently, an alternative 
interpretation for our findings could be that the positive relationship between debt and RM 
(but not AM) observed by this study may instead reflect debt-holders’ preference, and thus 
may not constitute purely a choice of EM practice, but rather a strategy of value transfer and 
risk redistribution from debt-holders to equity holders.  
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At the same time, we provide evidence that the substitution effect between unexpected levels 
of RM and AM ascertained by past research (Zang 2012) may turn into a complementarity 
effect for very high levels of leverage. Thus, very high levels of leverage (or relevant 
increases) could make firms unable to achieve earnings targets by relying only on one method 
of EM, so they have to complement one form with the other. The existence of high levels of 
(or increases in) financial leverage is expected to inherently result in differential levels of 
information between information-sharing insiders and different groups of outsiders, that is 
debt vs. equity holders. This provides the framing for the examination of our research 
questions within the revelation theory, which predicts that EM is possible when a number of 
perfect market conditions hold (Alhadab et al. 2015, Walker 2013). 
Finally, we find that leverage-induced AM is significantly more negatively penalised by 
market participants than relevant RM undertaken in relation to leverage (or changes in 
leverage), at least for a number of months after engaging in such practices. This evidence 
could be broadly consistent with findings by Badertscher (2011) that firms use RM to sustain 
their overvaluation. We consider that our evidence on the market-value consequences of debt-
induced AM and RM - which could be undertaken in the course of efforts to achieve earnings 
targets - provides a better understanding of the range of possible consequences of leverage. 
This is because such consequences of leverage-related EM could be incremental to other 
problems that debt may induce for corporate actions, e.g., underinvestment, and knowledge of 
such behaviour would be of interest for any party engaging in a lending or business 
transactions with the firm, or interested in investing in the firm. Thus, we consider that our 
evidence that market participants seem to under-react to RM but not to AM provides a better 
understanding of the economic consequences of RM vs. AM, with respect to ease of detection 
and formation of expectations about the future economic performance of firms accordingly.  
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics. The table reports summary statistics for the sample 
of suspect firm-year observations (as defined in Section 4.1) with accounting data on 
Compustat during 1990-2009. The sample consists of common stocks traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ, excluding financials (two-digit SIC codes 6000s) and regulated 
industries (two-digit SIC codes 4400-5000). The Table reports statistics for the debt ratio 
(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) and the change in the debt ratio 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡), the operating cycle (𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡), profitability 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡), Altman’s Z Score (𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡), the log of total assets used as a size proxy 
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡), the market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡), the marginal tax rates (𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡), market share 
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡), number of times of beating/meeting analysts’ consensus forecast from 
I/B/E/S in the past four quarters (𝐻𝑎𝑏𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡), the ratio of inventories and receivables as a 
percentage of total assets (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡), the log of 1 plus the number of analysts following 
the firm (𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡), the log of the number of shares outstanding (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡), and the 
% of firms with net operating assets above industry-year median for a given year (𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
and the % of firms with a BIG4 auditor (𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑖,𝑡). All variables have been calculated as defined 
in Section 4.2. For a suspect firm-year observation to be included in Table 1 (as well as in all 
subsequent analyses), it must have (post-truncation) a leverage ratio 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 < 10. The table 
also reports information for (signed) discretionary accruals, according to the Modified Jones, 
Jones and Kothari specifications, and also abnormal discretionary expenses (𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) 
and abnormal production costs (𝐴_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡), and RM1i,t. For comparability purposes with 
other RM measures, (𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) has been multiplied by negative one, so that the higher the 
value of this variable, the greater the possibility for a firm to engage in upward RM. 
Variables No. Obs. Q1 Mean Median Q3 St. Dev. 
       
Controls       
Levi,t = TDi,t/TAi,t 4,675 0.0933 0.4424 0.2175 0.3674 1.0954 
ΔLevi,t 4,257 -0.0596 -1.7998 -0.0137 0.0288 17.5483 
Cyclei,t 4,455 36.7120 93.3174 74.3560 126.1810 188.4593 
ROAi,t 4,469 0.0196 1.6485 0.0570 0.0936 11.6836 
ZScorei,t 4,520 1.3408 1.7264 2.1158 2.7995 3.7094 
Ln(TAi,t) 4,675 11.3836 12.0786 12.3427 13.0996 1.3299 
MVi,t/BVi,t 4,262 1.4563 3.0310 2.2885 3.6141 3.0259 
MTRi,t 3,804 0.0287 0.2293 0.3400 0.3500 0.1511 
MSharei,t 4,060 0.0069 0.0770 0.0253 0.0854 0.1357 
HabitBeateri,t 4,348 2.0000 2.6734 3.0000 4.0000 1.1623 
INVRECTAi,t 4,576 0.1824 5.8368 0.3220 0.4855 34.7694 
Ln(AnalystFollowingi,t) 4,388 1.0986 1.7354 1.7918 2.1972 0.6554 
Ln(Sharesi,t) 4,570 9.4913 10.2356 10.1752 10.9248 1.0737 
       
Accrual-based EM       
 DAMJi,t (M. Jones) 3,472 -0.0330 0.1350 0.0247 0.1203 0.5771 
 DAJi,t (Jones) 3,553 -0.0322 0.1297 0.0257 0.1233 0.5273 
 DAKi,t (Kothari) 3,474 -0.0504 0.0528 0.0035 0.0748 0.2851 
       
Real EM       
A_DISEXPi,t 3,615 -0.1458  0.0342 0.0162 0.1899 0.7327 
A_PRODi,t  3,041 -0.1507 0.0031 -0.0201 0.1330 0.3440 
RM1i,t 2,861 -0.2611 0.0417 0.0207 0.3015 0.6723 
       
Dummy vars (% firms with)       
NOAi,t > Industry Mediant 3,538  0.5520   0.4974 
Auditor BIGi,t 4,675  0.9204   0.2707 
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Table 2: Correlation Coefficients. The table reports pair-wise correlation coefficients between accrual-based earnings management measures and real earnings 
management measures for the sample suspect firms (defined in Section 4.1). Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the main diagonal and Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients are reported below the main diagonal. For comparability purposes with other RM measures, (𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) has been multiplied by 
negative one, so that the higher the value of this variable, the greater the possibility that a firm is engaging in upward RM. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
RM1i,t 
 
 
A_DISEXPi,t 
 
 
A_PRODi,t 
 
 
DAMJi,t 
(M. Jones) 
 
DAJi,t 
(Jones) 
 
DAKi,t 
(Kothari) 
 
RM1i,t 
 
 
_ 
 
0.8313** 0.7796*** 0.1601*** 0.1560*** 0.1788*** 
 
A_DISEXPi,t 
 
0.8463*** 
 
_ 
 
0.2704*** 0.2080*** 0.2087*** 0.0511** 
 
A_PRODi,t 
 
0.8073*** 0.4520*** 
 
_ 
 
0.1139*** 0.1497*** 0.1260*** 
 
DAMJi,t 
(M. Jones) 
0.1843*** 0.1324*** 0.1418*** 
 
_ 
 
0.9186*** 0.6735*** 
 
DAJi,t 
(Jones) 
0.1693*** 0.1379*** 0.1359*** 0.8515*** 
 
_ 
 
0.5962*** 
 
DAKi,t 
(Kothari) 
0.1489*** 0.0564*** 0.1920*** 0.7888*** 0.6964*** 
 
_ 
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Table 3: Portfolio Analysis of Leverage Levels and Changes and Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management. For the sample of suspect firm-years (as 
defined in Section 4.1), the Table reports medians of accrual-based and real earnings management measures for five, annually-rebalanced portfolios based on 
leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡- Panel A) and changes in leverage (𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡- Panel B).  Portfolio 1 consists of the firms with the lowest TD/TA (or change in TD/TA) in every year, 
while Portfolio 5 consists of the firms with the highest TD/TA (or change in TD/TA). (𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) has been multiplied by negative one as discussed in Section 3.2. 
A †, ††, ††† indicates that the portfolio median is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. A ‡, ‡‡ and ‡‡‡ indicates 
that the Wilcoxon rank sum test statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the EM metrics of Portfolios 5 and 1 are from distributions with equal medians at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level respectively. z-values of the Wilcoxon rank sum test statistic appear in square brackets. 
Panel A: Levels of Leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
Portfolios  Accrual-based Earnings Management  Real Earnings Management 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  Jones Modified Jones Kothari  A_PRODi,t A_DISEXPi,t RM1i,t 
1-Lowest  0.032
†††
 0.027
†††
 -0.004  -0.078
†††
   -0.033
†††
 -0.089
†††
 
2  0.041
†††
 0.038
†††
 0.009
†††
  -0.045
†††
 0.005 -0.029
†
 
3  0.029
†††
 0.030
†††
 0.008
†††
  -0.005  0.031
†††
 0.066
†††
 
4  0.019
†††
 0.016
†††
 -0.004  -0.003  0.021
†††
 0.037
†††
 
5-Highest  0.021
†††
 0.017
†††
 0.007
†††
  0.012
††
  0.029
†††
 0.059
†††
 
         
Difference  -0.011
‡
 -0.010 0.011  0.090
‡‡‡
  0.062
‡‡‡
 0.148
‡‡‡
 
Port.5.- Port.1  [-1.69] [-1.27] [1.46]  [7.35]  [5.51] [6.53] 
         
Panel B: Changes in Leverage (𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑇𝛢𝑖,𝑡 −⁄ 𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑇𝛢𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) 
Portfolios  Accrual-based Earnings Management  Real Earnings Management 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  Jones Modified Jones Kothari  A_PRODi,t A_DISEXPi,t RM1i,t 
1-Lowest  0.028
†††
 0.022
†††
 -0.011  -0.045
†††
 -0.012
††
 -0.045
††
 
2  0.013
†††
 0.011
†††
 -0.012  -0.032
††
  0.038
†††
 0.046
†††
 
3  0.015
†††
 0.012
†††
 -0.004  -0.020  0.012
††
 0.018 
4  0.028
†††
 0.026
†††
 0.015
†††
  -0.002   0.033
†††
 0.046
†††
 
5-Highest  0.045
†††
 0.041
†††
 0.023
†††
  0.007               0.012 0.044
††
 
         
Difference  0.017
‡‡‡
 0.019
‡‡‡
 0.034
‡‡‡
  0.052
‡‡‡
  0.024
‡‡
 0.099
‡‡‡
 
Port.5.- Port.1  [2.23] [2.82] [5.90]  [3.14]  [2.50] [2.92] 
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Table 4: Financial Leverage, Financial Health, and Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management.  For the sample of suspect firm-years (as defined in 
Section 4.1), the Table reports medians of accrual-based and real earnings management measures for firms with Altman’s Z score (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡) values <1.81 (‘Distressed 
firms’) and Z Score values above or equal to 1.81 (‘Healthy firms’) grouped into one of five leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) annually rebalanced portfolios. (𝐴_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) has 
been multiplied by negative one as discussed in Section 3.2.  A †, ††, ††† indicates that the portfolio median is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level respectively. A ‡, ‡‡ and ‡‡‡ indicates that the Wilcoxon rank sum test statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the EM metrics of firms with an 
Altman’s Z score below/above 1.81 are from distributions with equal medians at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. p-values of the Wilcoxon rank 
sum test statistic appear in square brackets. 
Levels of Leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
  Accrual-based Earnings Management  Real Earnings Management 
Portfolios  Jones Modified Jones Kothari  A_PRODi,t A_DISEXPi,t RM1i,t 
of               
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  Altman’s  𝑍 Altman’s  𝑍 Altman’s  𝑍  Altman’s  𝑍 Altman’s  𝑍 Altman’s  𝑍 
  Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy  Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy 
               
1-Lowest  0.0008 0.0317
†††
 0.0002 0.0257
†††
 0.106 -0.0046  0.0001 -0.0845
†††
 -0.0484 -0.0371
†††
 0.0012 -0.0934 
Diff. H - D  0.0309 [0.62] 0.0255 [0.70] -0.0152 [0.30]  -0.0844 [0.20] 0.0113 [0.59] -0.0946 [0.90] 
           
2  0.1417
†††
 0.0355
†††
 0.1337
†††
 0.0366
†††
 0.1001
†††
 0.0065
†††
  0.3828
††
 -0.0468
†††
 -0.2345
†††
 0.0041 0.1690 -0.0418
†††
 
Diff. H - D  -0.1061
‡‡‡
 [0.00] -0.0970
‡‡‡
 [0.00] -0.0937
‡‡‡
 [0.00]  -0.4295
‡‡‡
 [0.00] 0.2385
‡‡‡
 [0.00] -0.2108 [0.19] 
           
3  0.1037
†††
 0.0291
†††
 0.1523
†††
 0.0286
†††
 0.1102
†††
 0.0032
†††
  -0.0075 -0.0056 -0.0080 0.0316
†††
 0.2634 0.0572
†††
 
Diff. H - D  -0.0746
‡‡‡
 [0.00] -0.1237
‡‡‡
 [0.00] -0.1070
‡‡‡
 [0.00]  0.0019 [0.57] 0.0396 [0.42] -0.2062 [0.24] 
            
4  0.0050 0.0190
†††
 0.0238 0.0147
†††
 0.0105 -0.0056  0.0528
†
 -0.0094 0.0090 0.0297
†††
 0.0055 0.0520
†††
 
Diff. H - D  0.0140 [0.87] -0.0092 [0.61] -0.0161 [0.31]  -0.0622
‡‡
 [0.03] 0.0207
‡
 [0.06] 0.0465 [0.74] 
            
5-Highest  0.0284
†††
 0.0186
†††
 0.0205
†††
 0.0172
†††
 0.0154
†††
 0.0010
†
  0.0263
††
 0.0011 0.0207 0.0322
†††
 0.0672
†††
 0.0460
†††
 
Diff. H - D  -0.0098 [0.12] -0.0033 [0.20] -0.0143
‡
 [0.08]  -0.0251 [0.14] 0.0115 [0.23] -0.0212 [0.37] 
               
Difference  0.0276 -0.0131
‡
 0.0203 -0.0085 0.0048 0.0056  0.0263 0.0856
‡‡‡
 0.0692
‡‡‡
 0.0693
‡‡‡
 0.0660 0.1394
‡‡‡
 
Port.5.- Port.1  [0.53] [0.07] [0.51] [0.26] [0.77] [0.29]  [0.67] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.00] 
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Table 5: Leverage Levels and EM: Regression Analysis. In Panel A, the Table reports 
estimation results of the following probit model, used as the first step of the Heckman (1979) 
procedure: 
𝑃𝑟[𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 1] = 𝛷(𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐻𝑎𝑏𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛾6,𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡𝜸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) 
The variable 𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is suspect of earnings 
management, and zero if firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is non-suspect. For the definitions of earnings 
management suspect and non-suspect firm-years, see the details in Section 4.1. Operators 𝑃𝑟[. ] and 
𝛷(. ) denote probability and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution respectively. All independent variables are as defined in Section 4.1. The marginal 
effect is calculated as the change in 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?) when the variable in question in the vector of 
independent variables 𝒛𝑖,𝑡 changes by one, and all other variables are set at their mean values (all 
year indicators are set to zero in the marginal effects calculations). 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿 denotes the maximised 
log-likelihood and LR 𝜒2 stat. is the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square test under the null hypothesis 
that at least one of the independent variables’ coefficients is not equal to zero, and the test’s p-value 
appears in square brackets. 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2 is McFadden’s measure of goodness of fit, computed as 
1 − 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿/𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐, where 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐 denotes the (constrained) log-likelihood of a model with an 
intercept only. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate coefficient statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Heckman (1979) first step probit model estimation results 
  Pred. Sign  Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal effect 
         
Intercept    -3.0470***  -14.82   
         
𝐻𝑎𝑏𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡  +  0.1553***  12.53  0.0210 
         
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  +  0.0890***  3.10  0.0153 
         
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  0.1024***  5.22  0.0193 
         
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1  +  -0.0014  -0.98  -0.0001 
         
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡    -0.0018  -1.26  -0.0003 
         
Year Indicators    Yes     
         
LR 𝜒2 stat. 
 
 
 406.48### 
[0.000] 
 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2  0.0416 
No. Obs.    12,583  𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿  -4,681.83 
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In Panel B, the Table reports estimation results of the following recursive system of equations that 
constitute the second step of the Heckman (1979) procedure: 
𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼2,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛼3,𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑀𝑙,𝑖,𝑡
𝑙
+ ∑ 𝛼4,𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑚
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛽3,𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑀𝑙,𝑖,𝑡
𝑙
+ ∑ 𝛽4,𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑚
+ 𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
The dependent variables 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 are respectively the real earnings management and 
accrual-based earnings management metrics outlined in Section 3 (of the former only the 
comprehensive 𝑅𝑀1𝑖,𝑡 and of the latter only the Modified Jones model are reported for brevity). 
All independent variables are as defined in Section 4.1. 𝑅?̂?𝑖,𝑡 is the predicted values from the first 
equation of the recursive system, while 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the inverse of Mill’s ratio (the non-selection 
hazard rate) from the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure, calculated as 
𝜑(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?) 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?)⁄ , with 𝜑(. ) the density and 𝛷(. ) the cumulative density function of the standard 
normal distribution. z-statistic values are reported in parentheses, and asterisks *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The Wald 𝜒2 statistic is 
a Wald test that all coefficients in the regression model (except the constant) are all equal to zero 
(and its p-value is reported in square brackets). The Wald 𝜒2 statistic for 
(𝐻2𝑎): 𝛽5 + 𝛽6 × 𝐿𝑒?̃? ≤ 0 is a one-sided Wald test that the coefficient of 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡, 
evaluated at the median leverage 𝐿𝑒?̃?, is non-positive. Our (𝐻2) hypothesis predicts that this null 
should be rejected. (p-values of Wald tests are reported in square brackets). 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿 denotes the 
maximised log-likelihood and 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2 is McFadden’s measure of goodness of fit, computed as 
1 − 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿/𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐, where 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐 denotes the (constrained) log-likelihood of a model with an 
intercept only. 
Panel B: Regression estimation results for AM and RM – second step of Heckman (1979) model 
  𝑅𝑀 equation (𝑅𝑀1𝑖,𝑡)  𝐴𝑀 equation (𝑀𝐽𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡) 
  Pred. Sign  Coefficient  Pred. Sign  Coefficient 
         
Intercept  
 
 -1.9489*** 
(-7.24) 
 
 
 -0.0207 
(-0.02) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
 
+ 
 0.1636* 
(1.90) 
 
- 
 -0.0480 
(-0.24) 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 -0.1931*** 
(-5.50) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 0.4889*** 
(4.24) 
Costs Associated with Real Activities Manipulation 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
+ 
 -0.1262 
(-1.28) 
 
 
 0.1602 
(1.20) 
𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
+ 
 -0.0136 
(-1.41) 
 
 
 -0.0017 
(-0.11) 
𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 
- 
 0.1179 
(1.16) 
 
 
 0.2075* 
(1.65) 
Costs Associated with Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.0640 
(-1.16) 
 
- 
 0.0045 
(0.06) 
𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
 
 -0.0752** 
(-2.56) 
 
- 
 -0.1379** 
(-2.37) 
𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
 
 -0.0004*** 
(-3.59) 
 
+ 
 -0.0001 
(-0.57) 
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Control Variables 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.2378** 
(-2.02) 
 
 
 -0.0225*** 
(-3.46) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 0.0830*** 
(4.22) 
 
 
 -0.0660 
(-1.34) 
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.0225*** 
(-3.96) 
 
 
 -0.0127 
(-0.81) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 0.0953** 
(2.04) 
 
 
 
 
𝑅?̂?𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.7964 
(-1.35) 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 0.7226*** 
(17.19) 
 
 
 0.0358 
(0.47) 
         
Wald 𝜒2 stat. 
 
 
 77.88### 
[0.000] 
 
 
 101.86### 
[0.000] 
Wald 𝜒2 stat. for        10.48### 
(𝐻2): 𝛽5 + 𝛽6 × 𝐿𝑒?̃? ≤ 0        [0.006] 
         
No. Obs.    1,648    1,555 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2/LogL    0.2656/-6,062.47    0.3993/-5,925.903 
         
Variance-Inflation-Factors (VIFs) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡    1.4237    1.7646 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡    1.2171    1.8734 
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Table 6: Leverage Levels and EM: Regression Analysis. The Table summarises the estimation results of the 
recursive system of equations in (2) that constitute the second step of the Heckman (1979) procedure. This is 
identical to Table 4, only the continuous variable 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is now replaced by the sum of five multiplicative 
terms 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞, 𝑞 = {1,2,3,4,5}. The indicator function 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞 takes the value of one if the 
leverage of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 belongs to the 𝑞𝑡ℎ leverage quantile over the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
The Wald 𝜒2 statistic for (𝐻2𝑎): 𝛽5 + 𝛽6 × 𝐿𝑒?̃?𝑞=5 ≤ 0 is an one-sided Wald test that the coefficient of 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡, evaluated at the median leverage of high-levered sample firms, 𝐿𝑒?̃?𝑞=5, is non-positive. 
Our (𝐻2) hypothesis predicts that this null should be rejected (the p-value of the Wald test is reported in 
square brackets). All other variable definitions and reported statistics are as in Table 4, and asterisks *, ** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
  𝑅𝑀 equation (𝑅𝑀1𝑖,𝑡)  𝐴𝑀 equation (𝑀𝐽𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡) 
  Pred. Sign  Coefficient  Pred. Sign  Coefficient 
         
Intercept  
 
 3.0131*** 
(7.22) 
 
 
 -0.2192 
(-0.19) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=1 (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
 
+ 
 1.0800 
(0.81) 
 
 
 1.8381 
(1.02) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=2 
 
+ 
 1.1398** 
(2.08) 
 
 
 1.2360 
(1.56) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=3 
 
+ 
 0.4582 
(1.38) 
 
 
 0.5024 
(1.11) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=4 
 
+ 
 0.5434** 
(2.28) 
 
 
 0.1325 
(0.37) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=5 (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
 
+ 
 0.6337*** 
(3.13) 
 
 
 0.0663 
(0.29) 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 -0.1005** 
(-2.45) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=1  
(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.8111 
(-0.57) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.3817 
(-0.66) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.0471 
(0.13) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.3344 
(1.24) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=5  
(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.4691*** 
(3.54) 
Costs Associated with Real Activities Manipulation 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
+ 
 0.2618 
(1.54) 
 
 
 0.1415 
(1.06) 
𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
+ 
 0.0235 
(1.58) 
 
 
 0.0014 
(0.09) 
𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 
- 
 0.0950 
(0.55) 
 
 
 0.1920 
(1.50) 
Costs Associated with Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.0119 
(-0.13) 
 
- 
 0.0077 
(0.11) 
𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
 
 -0.0618 
(-1.23) 
 
- 
 -0.1382** 
(-2.35) 
𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
 
 -0.0003* 
(-1.95) 
 
+ 
 -0.0002 
(-0.72) 
Control Variables 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡    -0.4946**    -0.0234*** 
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(-2.24) (-3.54) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.0954*** 
(-2.90) 
 
 
 -0.0631 
(-1.27) 
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.0531*** 
(-5.42) 
 
 
 -0.0121 
(-0.76) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 0.1935** 
(2.22) 
 
 
 
 
𝑅?̂?𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.8176 
(-1.38) 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -1.2905*** 
(-18.82) 
 
 
 0.0416 
(0.56) 
         
Wald 𝜒2 stat. 
 
 
 81.37*** 
[0.000] 
 
 
 106.64*** 
[0.000] 
Wald 𝜒2 stat. for        9.50## 
(𝐻2): 𝛽5 + 𝛽6 × 𝐿𝑒?̃?𝑞=5 ≤ 0        [0.010] 
         
No. Obs.    1,648    1,555 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2/LogL    0.2629/-6,056.16    0.3996/-6,711.52 
         
Variance-Inflation-Factors (VIFs) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡    1.3565    1.0621 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡    1.3258    1.2219 
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Table 7: Different Changes in Leverage and EM: Regression Analysis. The Table summarises the 
estimation results of the recursive system of equations in (2) that constitute the second step of the Heckman 
(1979) procedure, only now the continuous variable 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is replaced by the sum of five multiplicative terms 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞, 𝑞 = {1,2,3,4,5}. The indicator function 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=𝑞 takes the value of one if the 
leverage annual change 𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 belongs to the 𝑞
𝑡ℎ leverage change quantile over the sample 
period, and zero otherwise. The Wald 𝜒2 statistic for (𝐻2): 𝛽5 + 𝛽6 × 𝛥𝐿𝑒?̃?𝑞=5 ≤ 0 is an one-sided Wald test 
that the coefficient of 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡, evaluated at the median leverage change of sample firms in the 
𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=5 quintile, 𝛥𝐿𝑒?̃?𝑞=5, is non-positive. Our (𝐻2) hypothesis predicts that this null should be rejected 
(the p-value of the Wald test is reported in square brackets).All variable definitions and reported statistics are 
as in Table 4, and asterisks *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
  𝑅𝑀 equation (𝑅𝑀1𝑡)  𝐴𝑀 equation (𝑀𝐽𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑡) 
  Pred. Sign  Coefficient  Pred. Sign  Coefficient 
         
Intercept  
 
 2.7185*** 
(6.74) 
 
 
 3.0570*** 
(3.29) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=1 (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
 
+ 
 -0.2141 
(-0.49) 
 
 
 -0.3057 
(-0.57) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=2 
 
+ 
 -1.4312 
(-1.28) 
 
 
 -0.5023 
(-0.28) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=3 
 
+ 
 -3.7338 
(-0.87) 
 
 
 -5.2482 
(-0.79) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=4 
 
+ 
 0.0326 
(0.09) 
 
 
 -0.4838 
(-0.26) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=5 (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
 
+ 
 2.5598** 
(1.97) 
 
 
 -1.5258** 
(-2.52) 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.08483* 
(-1.82) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=1  
(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.1159 
(0.32) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.1708 
(0.85) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.5532 
(1.05) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.1908 
(0.13) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝟏𝛥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒=5  
(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.8504* 
(1.68) 
Costs Associated with Real Activities Manipulation 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
+ 
 0.2885* 
(1.70) 
 
 
 0.3743*** 
(2.99) 
𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
+ 
 -0.0013 
(-0.09) 
 
 
 0.0036 
(0.24) 
𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 
- 
 0.1119 
(0.65) 
 
 
 0.0995 
(0.79) 
Costs Associated with Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.0248 
(-0.26) 
 
- 
 0.0938 
(1.32) 
𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
 
 -0.0635 
(-1.26) 
 
- 
 -00153 
(-0.31) 
𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
 
 -0.0004** 
(-2.39) 
 
+ 
 0.0005** 
(2.31) 
Control Variables 
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𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.5855*** 
(-2.63) 
 
 
 -0.0175** 
(-2.34) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.0632** 
(-2.00) 
 
 
 -0.1888*** 
(-4.34) 
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -0.0555*** 
(-5.74) 
 
 
 0.0263** 
(2.03) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 0.2342*** 
(2.66) 
 
 
 
 
𝑅?̂?𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.9195** 
(2.06) 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 -1.2476*** 
(-17.59) 
 
 
 0.0247 
(0.30) 
         
Wald 𝜒2 stat. 
 
 
 75.97*** 
[0.000] 
 
 
 80.37*** 
[0.000] 
Wald 𝜒2 stat. for        1.30 
(𝐻2): 𝛽5 + 𝛽6 × 𝛥𝐿𝑒?̃?𝑞=5 ≤ 0        [0.255] 
         
No. Obs.    1,626    1,540 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2/Logl    0.2698/-6,902.93    0.4026/-5,893.54 
         
Variance-Inflation-Factors (VIFs) 
𝛥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡    1.0051    1.1567 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡    1.3548    1.4354 
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Table 8: Leverage Levels, EM, and Subsequent Stock Market Performance for Suspect Firms. 
Each year we construct 9 portfolios for observations falling into the bottom 30%, middle 40% or top 
30% of total suspect firm-year observations based on (a) suspect firms’ leverage Levi,t and (b) suspect 
firms’ earnings management (real and accrual-based) metrics, RMi,t and AMi,t,. For each portfolio every 
year t, we record its equally-weighted median buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) starting April t+1 
for the next 3, 12 and 24 months in Panels A, B and C of the Table, respectively. We calculate BHARs as 
in Barber and Lyon (1997), where each suspect firm is matched each sample year with a control firm of 
similar size and book-to-market ratio, and the control firm’s buy-and-hold return acts as the benchmark 
return in equation (3) of the text. A 
†
, 
††
, 
†††
 indicates that the portfolio median is statistically different 
from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. In rows/columns entitled H0: Equal 
Medians we report portfolio differences and z-values (in square brackets) under the null hypothesis that 
the medians of the indicated portfolios are equal. An #, ##, ### indicates that the null is rejected at the 
10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
Panel A: 3-month Portfolio BHARs 
3-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of Levi,t (Leverage level)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of DAMJi,t 
(M. Jones) 
Bottom 30% 0.023
‡,a
 0.043 0.078
‡‡‡
     0.055       [1.04] 
      
Mid 40% 0.001 0.046
‡
 0.030
‡
  0.030        [0.86] 
      
Top 30% -0.080
‡‡
 -0.025 -0.039
‡‡,b
  0.040        [0.36] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
-0.103### 
[-2.91] 
-0.068#  
[-1.81] 
-0.117### 
[-3.37] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.063## 
[-2.56] 
 
3-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of Levi,t (Leverage level)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of RMi,t 
Bottom 30% 0.025
 a
 0.024 0.047       0.022       [-0.09] 
      
Mid 40% -0.022 0.013 -0.010   0.012         [0.83] 
      
Top 30% 0.000 0.003 0.016
 b
  0.017        [0.95] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
-0.025 
[-1.12] 
-0.021 
[-0.20] 
-0.031 
[-0.02] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.008 
[-0.11] 
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Panel B: 12-month Portfolio BHARs 
12-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of Levi,t (Leverage level)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of DAMJi,t 
(M. Jones) 
Bottom 30% 0.080
a
 -0.037 -0.026  -0.107        [-0.93] 
      
Mid 40% 0.056 0.152
‡‡
 0.047  -0.009        [-0.28] 
      
Top 30% -0.024 -0.046 -0.047
b
  -0.022        [-0.00] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
-0.105 
[-1.49] 
-0.010 
[0.40] 
-0.021 
[-0.62] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.127 
[-1.53] 
 
12-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of Levi,t (Leverage level)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of RMi,t 
Bottom 30% 0.025
a
 0.060 0.099  0.074        [0.50] 
      
Mid 40% 0.000 -0.001 0.057          0.056       [0.88] 
      
Top 30% 0.113
‡
 0.126
‡‡
 0.035
b
  -0.077       [-0.98] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
0.088 
[1.13] 
0.065 
[1.23] 
-0.064 
[-0.26] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
0.010 
[0.21] 
 
Panel C: 24-month Portfolio BHARs 
24-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of Levi,t (Leverage level)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of DAMJi,t 
(M. Jones) 
Bottom 30% 0.138
a
 -0.096 0.124  -0.014        [-0.70] 
      
Mid 40% 0.213
‡‡‡
 0.188
‡‡
 0.000  -0.213##      [-2.25] 
      
Top 30% -0.006 0.028 -0.074
b
  -0.067        [0.22] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
-0.144 
[-1.55] 
0.124 
[1.25] 
-0.197 
[-0.63] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.211 
[-1.28] 
 
24-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of Levi,t (Leverage level)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of RMi,t 
Bottom 30% -0.001
a
 -0.003 0.105  0.106        [0.17] 
      
Mid 40% 0.043 0.081 -0.035          -0.079       [-0.81] 
      
Top 30% 0.135
‡
 0.122 0.111
b
  -0.024       [-0.56] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
0.136 
[0.99] 
0.125 
[0.60] 
0.006 
[0.24] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
0.112 
[0.38] 
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Table 9: Leverage Changes, EM, and Subsequent Stock Market Performance for Suspect Firms. 
Each year we construct 9 portfolios for observations falling into the bottom 30%, middle 40% or top 
30% of total suspect firm-year observations based on (a) suspect firms’ change in leverage ΔLevi,t and (b) 
suspect firms’ earnings management (real and accrual-based) metrics, RMi,t and AMi,t,. For each portfolio 
every year t, we record its equally-weighted median buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) starting April 
t+1 for the next 3, 12 and 24 months in Panels A, B and C of the Table, respectively. We calculate 
BHARs as in Barber and Lyon (1997), where each suspect firm is matched each sample year with a 
control firm of similar size and book-to-market ratio, and the control firm’s buy-and-hold return acts as 
the benchmark return in equation (3) of the text. A 
†
, 
††
, 
†††
 indicates that the portfolio median is 
statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. In rows/columns 
entitled H0: Equal Medians we report portfolio differences and z-values (in square brackets) under the 
null hypothesis that the medians of the indicated portfolios are equal. An #, ##, ### indicates that the null 
is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
Panel A: 3-month Portfolio BHARs 
3-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of ΔLevi,t (Leverage changes)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of DAMJi,t 
(M. Jones) 
Bottom 30% 0.045
a
 0.054 0.070
‡‡
  0.024       [0.64] 
      
Mid 40% 0.036
‡
 0.029
‡
 0.040
‡‡
  0.004      [0.31] 
      
Top 30% 0.093
‡‡
 -0.023 -0.114
‡‡,b
  -0.207###  [-3.22] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
0.048 
[0.32] 
-0.077# 
[-1.77] 
-0.184### 
[-3.59] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.160### 
[-2.96] 
 
3-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of ΔLevi,t (Leverage changes)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of RMi,t 
Bottom 30% 0.035
‡,a
 0.037 -0.002  -0.037       [-0.18] 
      
Mid 40% 0.000 0.072 -0.051  -0.051       [-0.66] 
      
Top 30% 0.090
‡‡
 0.016 0.019
b
  -0.071       [-0.98] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
0.055 
[0.36] 
-0.021 
[-0.21] 
0.021 
[-0.49] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.016 
[-0.69] 
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Panel B: 12-month Portfolio BHARs 
12-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of ΔLevi,t (Leverage changes)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of DAMJi,t 
(M. Jones) 
Bottom 30% 0.096
a
 -0.058 0.001  -0.095       [-0.71] 
      
Mid 40% 0.031 0.091
‡
 -0.037  -0.068      [-0.84] 
      
Top 30% 0.087 0.046 -0.013
b
  -0.100     [-1.00] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
-0.009 
[-0.67] 
0.104 
[0.37] 
-0.014 
[-0.90] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.109 
[-1.62] 
 
12-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of ΔLevi,t (Leverage changes)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of RMi,t 
Bottom 30% 0.095
‡,a
 0.099 -0.013  -0.108       [-1.36] 
      
Mid 40% 0.007 0.078 -0.013   -0.020       [-1.21] 
      
Top 30% 0.137 0.021 0.002
b
  -0.135       [-1.23] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
0.042 
[0.12] 
-0.077 
[-1.23] 
0.015 
[0.08] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.093 
[-1.36] 
 
Panel C: 24-month Portfolio BHARs 
24-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of ΔLevi,t (Leverage changes)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of DAMJi,t 
(M. Jones) 
Bottom 30% 0.177
a
 0.059 0.261
‡‡
  0.084       [0.94] 
      
Mid 40% 0.292
‡‡‡
 0.274
‡‡‡
 0.012  -0.208###  [-2.59] 
      
Top 30% 0.000 -0.018 -0.010
b
  -0.010     [0.41] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
-0.177 
[-0.94] 
-0.077 
[-0.85] 
-0.271 
[-1.61] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.187 
[-0.66] 
 
24-month Portfolio BHARs Portfolios of ΔLevi,t (Leverage changes)  H0: Equal Medians 
  Bottom 30% Mid 40% Top 30%  Portfolios 3 and 1 
Portfolios 
of RMi,t 
Bottom 30% 0.083
a
 0.117 0.066  -0.016       [-0.69] 
      
Mid 40% 0.144
‡‡
 0.074 -0.061   -0.205##     [-2.04] 
      
Top 30% 0.202
‡‡
 0.036 -0.070
b
  -0.272#      [-1.80] 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios 3 and 1 
0.119 
[0.69] 
-0.081 
[-0.84] 
-0.136 
[-0.47] 
 
H0: Equal Medians 
Portfolios b and a 
-0.153 
[-1.22] 
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Appendix A 
In this Appendix, we report buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for sample suspect firms with Altman’s Z score (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡) values <1.81 (‘Distressed firms’) and Z 
Score values above or equal to 1.81 (‘Healthy firms’) grouped into one of five leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) annually rebalanced portfolios.  
Table A1: Suspect Firm Leverage and Market Performance.  The Table reports equally-weighted median buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), starting from 
April of year t+1 over the next 3, 12 and 24 months across all sample years, for sample suspect firms with Altman’s Z score (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡) values <1.81 (‘Distressed 
firms’) and Z Score values above or equal to 1.81 (‘Healthy firms’) grouped into one of five leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) annually rebalanced portfolios. A †, ††, ††† indicates 
that the portfolio median is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. A ‡, ‡‡ and ‡‡‡ indicates that the Wilcoxon rank 
sum test statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the BHAR of firms with an Altman’s Z score below/above the cut-off level are from distributions with equal 
medians at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. z-values of the Wilcoxon rank sum test statistic appear in square brackets. 
  3-month 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅  12-month 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅  24-month 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 
Portfolios  Portfolios of 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡 Difference  Portfolios of 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡 Difference  Portfolios of 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡 Difference 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  1-
Distressed 
2- 
Healthy 
Port. 2-Port. 1 
 1-
Distressed 
2- 
Healthy 
Port. 2-Port. 1 
 1-  
Distressed 
2-     
Healthy 
Port. 2-Port. 1 
1-Lowest  -0.0470 0.0001 0.0471
‡ 
  [1.81]  -0.0061 0.0028 0.0089   [0.59]  -0.1784
†††
 0.0069 0.1853
‡‡ 
 [2.08] 
             
2  -0.0273 0.0079
††
 0.0352
‡‡ 
 [2.04]  -0.0181 0.0394
†††
 0.0575   [1.03]  -0.0323 0.0333
†
 0.0656   [0.36] 
             
3  -0.0181 0.0003 0.0184
   
 [0.59]  0.0332
††
 0.0001 -0.0331
‡‡‡ 
[-2.50]  -0.0030 -0.0004 0.0026   [-0.22] 
             
4  -0.0182 0.0086 0.0269    [1.49]  -0.0087 0.0037 0.0124   [-0.78]  -0.0490 0.0081 0.0570   [0.15] 
             
5-Highest  0.0537
†††
 0.0188
†††
 -0.0349
‡‡‡
[-3.18]  0.0146
†
 0.0465
†††
 0.0320   [0.69]  0.0274
†††
 0.0584
†††
 0.0311   [0.12] 
 
 
